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I. INTRODUCTION
AUTONOMY is one of the central values that shapes law gen-
erally and mental health law in particular.' Many legal rules
in the mental health area reflect a careful balancing of autonomy
values against the state's interests in paternalism and in the pro-
tection of community safety. 2 However, the justifications for val-
uing autonomy have been insufficiently examined. Indeed,
autonomy has its critics.
3
This Article examines justifications for our preference for in-
dividual autonomy from a number of perspectives. Section II of
the Article analyzes the treatment of autonomy values in constitu-
tional and legal doctrine, as well as in philosophical and political
theory. This section traces the autonomy principle to the political
thought that led to the American Revolution, the Constitution,
and the Bill of Rights. Further, this section analyzes in detail how
several areas of constitutional doctrine reflect autonomy values.
These areas of constitutional doctrine include the substantive due
process right of privacy/autonomy; the First Amendment rights
1. See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Be-
tween Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15 (1991) [hereinafter Competency to
Consent to Treatment] (discussing autonomy in context of informed consent doc-
trine); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 169
(1991) [hereinafter Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization] (discussing
autonomy as it relates to voluntary hospitalization); BruceJ. Winick, The Right to
Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1
(1989) [hereinafter Right to Refuse] (discussing autonomy in context of individu-
als' right to refuse treatment).
2. See Winick, Right to Refuse, supra note 1, at 90-101 (examining balancing
of interests that occurs in adjudicating patients' rights to refuse treatment);
BruceJ. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 985
(1985) (analyzing balancing of interests underlying competency to stand trial
doctrine); Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1201-02 (1974) (analyzing balancing of interests underlying
civil commitment doctrine).
3. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and
Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41
MD. L. REV. 563, 624-49 (1982) (defending ad hoc paternalistic interventions in
cases in which intersubjectivity produces in actor a strong intuition that benefici-
ary's choices are based on some form of false consciousness and are in fact
harmful, and also justifying instances of paternalism in contract and tort law);
Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, in FEMINIST LEGAL THE-
ORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 357, 358 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne
Kennedy eds., 1991) ("[T]he assumptions of autonomous individualism behind
American law, economic and political theory, and bureaucratic practices rests on
a picture of public and independent man rather than private-and often depen-
dent, or interconnected-woman."); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, in
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER, supra, at 210-34 (criti-
cizing autonomy as male-oriented and inconsistent with women's essential com-
munitarian nature).
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to freedom of religion, expression, and association; and the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants to exercise
control over their defense.
Section III of the Article conducts a therapeutic jurispru-
dence analysis 4 of autonomy and suggests that allowing individu-
als to make voluntary choices in matters vitally affecting them is
developmentally beneficial and may be essential to their psycho-
logical well-being. This section also examines principles of cogni-
tive and social psychology that suggest two important
propositions that support our deference to autonomy: (1) self-de-
termination enhances individuals' ability to set and achieve their
goals effectively; and (2) the alternative-government compulsion
of behavior thought to be beneficial-does not work as well.
Section IV of the Article then examines the implications of
the political and psychological value of choice in a number of im-
portant mental health law contexts. This section analyzes the
concept of competency, including competency to make treatment
and hospitalization decisions and competency to stand trial in the
criminal process. This section also examines the presumption in
favor of competency, recently questioned by the Supreme Court
in Zinermon v. Burch,5 and limitations on the states' parens patriae
power to interfere with individual choice.
II. AUTONOMY IN LEGAL AND POLTICAL THEORY
A. Philosophical Foundations
Respect for individual autonomy is deeply rooted in Ameri-
4. The theory of therapeutic jurisprudence suggests the need for study of
the therapeutic implications of various legal rules and practices. This theory
seeks to focus attention on an often neglected ingredient in the calculus neces-
sary for performing a sensible policy analysis of mental health law and practice-
the therapeutic dimension-and calls for its systematic empirical examination.
To identify the therapeutic dimension as a significant consideration is not, of
course, intended to suggest that it should trump other considerations. There
may well be countervailing normative considerations that outweigh the thera-
peutic consequences of a particular rule, and therapeutic jurisprudence is not a
method of determining which consideration should predominate in decision-
making. Its mission is merely to raise questions that call for a more complete
analysis of the relevant considerations.
For further discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence, see generally DAVID B.
WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991)
[hereinafter ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE]; David B. Wexler & Bruce
J. Winick, The Potential of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A New Approach to Law and Psy-
chology, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE BROADENING OF THE DISCIPLINE 211-39
(James R.P. Ogloff ed., 1992); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45
U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (1991).
5. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
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can constitutional history and tradition. The Constitution's fram-
ers were heavily influenced by Enlightenment views of popular
sovereignty and limited government. 6 For John Locke, the ideo-
logical father of the American Revolution, 7 liberty was freedom
from restraint, and the exercise of coercive power by the sover-
eign was always suspect. The function of the law, in Locke's view,
was to protect individual liberty from restraint by government or
others. For Locke, the "end of law" was "not to abolish or re-
strain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom." 8 As noted by Isaiah
Berlin, a central principle in Locke's thinking was that
there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal
freedom which must on no account be violated; for if it is
overstepped, the individual will find himself in an area
too narrow for even that minimum development of his
natural faculties which alone makes it possible to pursue,
and even to conceive, the various ends which men hold
good or right or sacred.9
This principle was reflected in the writings of Thomas Jeffer-
son, the drafter of the Declaration of Independence.10 Jefferson's
case for colonial grievances against the British Crown was based
6. See MORTIMER J. ADLER, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: UNDERSTANDING THE
IDEAS AND IDEALS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1987); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGI-
CAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 26-27 (1967) (concluding that En-
lightenment theories were "directly influential in shaping the thought of the
Revolutionary generation"); CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:
A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 24-79 (1942) (discussing pervasive
influence of various Enlightenment theorists on Jefferson and others); Louis
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1412-13 (1974) (noting
that Constitution blended concepts of popular sovereignty with limited govern-
ment); Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175, 176-
80 (1982) (discussing theories of various Enlightenment theorists and their ef-
fect on early American political thought).
7. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 5-6, 9-12, 39, 259 (1990); see also JOHN P. ROCHE, COURTS AND
RIGHTS 9-10 (1961) (noting Locke's "enormous impact" on colonial political
thought); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-
1787, at 14, 283-84 (1969) (noting that Locke's social compact concept became
increasingly significant after 1776). The ideological origins of the American
Revolution also included the Scottish "moral sense" philosophers, whose think-
ing was fully consistent with the liberalism of Locke. See GARY WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA (1978) (discussing the relationship between Locke's ideology and
moral sense philosophy and concluding that Locke's ideology influenced moral
sense philosophers).
8. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 57 (T. Peardon
ed. 1952) (emphasis deleted).
9. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 124 (1969).
10. GARRETT W. SHELDON, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 9, 12, 42-45 (1991).
1708 [Vol. 37: p. 1705
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not merely on commercial and political injustice, but also on the
natural rights of Englishmen. I Jefferson regarded these rights as
inherent in the individual and irrevocable, and as rights that the
King would not have dared to transgress in England. In the Dec-
laration of Independence, Jefferson expanded this notion into a
ringing call for freedom for all people. 12 The Declaration was
revolutionary, both as a formal document of rebellion and as a
stirring defense of unconditional human liberty. People were to
be free, according to Jefferson, not only because they so desired
or because tyranny was unjust. They were to be free because, in
Jefferson's view, they were in fact free under the laws of nature.'
3
Jefferson regarded human rights as an indissoluble birth-
right, given by the Creator and therefore inalienable. When Jef-
ferson emphasized the rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness"' 4 among those "inalienable rights"' 15 with which all
persons are endowed, he referred to a right that individuals had
against the government to pursue their own ends in their own
ways. Jefferson reiterated this ideal in his first Inaugural Address,
calling for "a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain
men from injuring one another, [but] shall leave them otherwise
free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improve-
ment."' 6 To secure this right of personal autonomy, among
other "blessings of liberty," the Colonists ordained and estab-
lished the Constitution.'
7
Individual autonomy was thus a primary value in the revolu-
tionary idealism that led to colonial independence. "Don't tread
on me" proclaimed the most famous colonial banner, and Patrick
Henry's demand-"Give me liberty or give me death"-became a
rallying cry for independence. Free of the yoke of colonial op-
pression, those who won our independence set about the task of
creating a governmental structure in which individual liberty
would be protected against government tyranny. A central gov-
ernment was needed that was stronger than the one contemplated
by the Articles of Confederation under which the thirteen colo-
11. See id. at 22-25.
12. See id. at 41.
13. See id. at 9, 25-27.
14. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
15. Id.
16. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in INAUGURAL
ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 13, 15 (Bicentennial ed.
1989).
17. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
170919921
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nies originally had banded together. Accordingly, those wise
framers of the basic charter of our government assembled at a
constitutional convention in Philadelphia. They rejected a con-
ception of government in which power flowed from the sover-
eign. This was to be a government in which the people were
sovereign, one founded by "[w]e the people,"18 in which the colo-
nies ceded power by explicit delegation to the new government,
but retained and reserved those powers not granted.
In the colonial debates on the ratification of the Constitution,
the absence of a Bill of Rights protecting individual liberty from
infringement by the new federal government became a frequently
voiced criticism of the new charter.' 9 Indeed, five of the eleven
colonies that ratified the Constitution by early 1789 proposed
amendments guaranteeing individual liberty against encroach-
ment by the federal government, 20 and, in 1791, the first ten
amendments, collectively known as the Bill of Rights, were
adopted. 2 1 These amendments were designed to safeguard per-
sonal freedom from interference by the newly formed national
government.
22
The First Amendment protected liberty of conscience, ex-
pression, and political freedom by denying Congress the power to
prohibit the "free exercise" of religion or to abridge "the free-
dom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
fully to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievance." 23 The Fourth Amendment, by prohibiting unreason-
able searches and seizures,24 protected the privacy of the home
and the security of the person. This amendment allowed individ-
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Richard Henry Lee, Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Re-
publican (Oct. 9, 1787), in ADLER, supra note 6, at 206.
20. See I JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328, 334 (2d ed. 1836)
[hereinafter DEBATES] (New York); 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra, at 659 (Virginia); 4
ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra, at 244 (North Carolina). See generally BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL
OF RIGHTS 119-59 (1977).
21. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
22. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 406 (11 th ed. 1985); JOHN E.
NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 315 (3d ed. 1986); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-2, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1988); Leonard W. Levy,
Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 258, 260, 266-67,
277 (2d ed. 1987).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Id.
1710 [Vol. 37: p. 1705
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uals freedom to control who entered their private domains25 and
protected "expectations of privacy," that is, "the individual's ex-
pectations that in certain places and at certain times he has 'the
right to be let alone.' -26 The Fifth Amendment protected
against governmental deprivations of liberty without "due pro-
cess of law" 27 and, in the criminal context, protected individuals'
freedom from compulsory self-incrimination, thereby reserving to
the individual a private enclave free from governmental intru-
sion.28 The Sixth Amendment provided additional protections to
criminal defendants by affording them rights to counsel of their
own choosing, to compulsory process to subpoena witnesses on
their behalf, to confront witnesses against them, and to a jury
trial.29 These Sixth Amendment rights provide individuals with
substantial autonomy in presenting their defense. The Ninth and
Tenth Amendments made it clear that the newly created national
government was a government of limited authority by providing
that the states and the people reserved and retained all powers
not delegated to the national government by the Constitution.30
25. In 1886, the Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment
was an essential protection of personal security and privacy. See Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886) ("It is not the breaking of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense, but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property .... "); id. at 630 (quoting Lord Camden's opinion in Entick v.
Carrington, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1029 (1765) that referred to the "indefeasible
right of personal security").
In more recent Fourth Amendment cases, the Court has noted that "[tihe
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (referring
to the "inestimable right of personal security").
26. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758-59 (1985) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment, which was
adopted in 1868, imposes a parallel due process requirement on the states. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. For an extensive discussion of the Supreme Court's
application of the Due Process Clause, see infra notes 44-155 and accompanying
text.
28. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) ("It reflects
many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: ... our respect for
the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life.").
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For further discussion of the Sixth Amend-
ment, see infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
30. See U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X. The Ninth Amendment provides that
"[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
For general discussions of the Ninth Amendment, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST 34-38 (1980); Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 1, 2-3, 14, 20 (1980); Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of
19921 1711
7
Winick: On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Individual autonomy is thus a value that infuses the Constitu-
tion. Liberty was to be a way of life, safeguarded from govern-
mental intrusion. In addition, respect for individual autonomy is
a central principle of much of our ethical and political theory.
The notion of individual autonomy is at the core of two major
ethical traditions in modern Western philosophy: consequential-
ist theories, such as the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill, and deontological theories, such as those of Im-
manuel Kant.3 '
John Stuart Mill's essay, On Liberty,3 2 one of the most influen-
tial defenses of individual freedom in the English language, was
published in 1859. This was just nine years before the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, of which the Due Process Clause
ultimately became the most important repository of constitutional
protection for individual autonomy. Mill regarded all govern-
mental restraint on individual choice as an evil. "[L]eaving peo-
ple to themselves is always better, caeteris paribus, than controlling
the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223, 227-28, 264-65 (1983); Symposium,
Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37 (1988). The Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
31. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789); IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE META-
PHYSICS OF MORALS (J. Beck trans., 1959); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (C.
Shields ed., 1956); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). For a general
discussion of autonomy's role in Western philosophy, with special emphasis on
the philosophies of Bentham, Kant, and Mill, see TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 171-74 (2d ed. 1983) (noting
Mills' antipaternalism); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF Au-
TONOMY (1988); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 3-51 (1986) (discussing auton-
omy and legal paternalism);JoEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF
LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 110-29 (1980) (discussing legal paternal-
ism); DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 71-72, 78, 80-
84, 90-91, 133, 154 (1986); ROLF SARTORIUS, PATERNALISM (1983); ROBERT PAUL
WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970) (setting forth ideology based upon
Kantian concept of moral autonomy); Tom L. Beauchamp, Paternalism and Bi-
obehavioral Control, 60 THE MONIST 62, 68-78 (1977) (defending Mill's anti-
paternalism); Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107
(Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1971) (examining Mill's objection to paternalistic
interference with individual liberty); Sharon Hill, Self-Determination and Autonomy,
in TODAY'S MORAL PROBLEMS 171 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1975) (discuss-
ing self-determination and autonomy in context of women's liberation); Ruth
Macklin & Susan Sherwin, Experimenting on Human Subjects: Philosophical Perspec-
tives, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 434, 437-43 (1975) (discussing Mill and Kant);
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (1968) (discussing
criminal's right to be punished).
32. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (C. Shields ed., 1956).
1712 [Vol. 37: p. 1705
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them." 33 The central premise of Mill's work, the "harm princi-
ple," is that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, indi-
vidually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of
any of their number, is self-protection." 34 Mill recognized the
government's police power interest in protecting the public health,
safety, and welfare, but argued that this interest in protecting the
community marks the outer boundary of governmental authority
over the individual. In Mill's view, "the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." 35 With
few exceptions, Mill would regard paternalistic interventions to
be beyond the government's authority. 36 Mill argued that the in-
dividual's "own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant" for governmental intrusion.37
Instead of relying upon the natural rights thinking so promi-
nent in Locke and Jefferson, Mill grounded his broad defense of
autonomy on the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, the theory
that defines moral good in terms of the greatest happiness for the
33. Id. at 97. Caeteris paribus translates roughly to "all things being equal."
34. Id. at 9.
35. Id.
36. Mill would permit the state to interfere with an individual's liberty in
order to protect the individual from ignorance when, because of the individual's
lack of information or misinformation, it appears that the actions that the indi-
vidual is about to take do not correspond to those that would have been taken
had the individual been enlightened. Thus, Mill wrote:
If either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting to cross
a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no
time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back,
without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing
what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river.
Id. at 97-98. However, Mill recognized that the appearance that the person was
acting out of ignorance might be mistaken and that the person might actually
desire to walk off the bridge for reasons that seem good to him. Id. Mill argued
that if the person is fully warned of the danger, and wished to proceed anyway,
his choice should be respected. Id. The officer's intrusion on the person's lib-
erty in order to warn him of the danger would be justified, but not necessarily a
further interference with his actions. Id.
Mill also allowed a second category of cases in which intrusion upon indi-
vidual autonomy would be justified. Mill illustrated this category with the exam-
ple of an individual who wishes to sell himself into slavery. When the individual
sells himself into slavery, "he abdicates his liberty; he forgoes any future use of it
beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose
which is the justification for allowing him to dispose of himself." Id. at 104.
Mill, in effect, viewed the individual as unable to alienate what Mill regarded as
inalienable rights. "The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be
free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom." Id.
Mill's "slave" exception is thus a narrow one and was regarded by him as such.
See id.
37. Id. at 9.
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greatest number.38 Mill believed that governmental interference
with individual choice would, on the whole, produce more harm
than would leaving individuals to make their own choices, even if
some individuals' choices proved imprudent. In Mill's opinion,
the state's imposition on the individual of its view of the individ-
ual's own good would ultimately be self-defeating, even if the
state was benevolently motivated. Mill felt that because the devel-
opment of the individual's basic faculties of choice and reasoning
are prerequisites to self-fulfillment, the individual's ability to en-
gage in autonomous decisionmaking is essential to attainment of
the individual's own good.39 In addition, competent adults know
their own interests, abilities, and natural preferences better than
the government and are thus far better able to direct their own
affairs and chart their own destiny. According to Mill, an individ-
ual's "voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is de-
sirable, or at least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole
best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursu-
ing it."40 Thus, the individual's own good is best accomplished
by allowing the individual to select his or her own goals and the
best methods of achieving them. Because an individual, in Mill's
view, is best suited to determine what is good for him or her, the
policy of respecting individual autonomy, even though it might in
some instances produce unwise choices, is most likely to promote
the individual's best interests and achieve the individual's highest
potential.
Mill's consequentialist justification for autonomy is limited by
the empirical assertion that a policy of respecting individual au-
tonomy would ultimately maximize the individual's and society's
well-being. However, even if a policy of deference to self-deter-
mination does not increase personal and societal utility, such a
policy can be defended on the premise that respect for an individ-
ual's autonomy is a basic moral obligation. Western moral tradi-
tion posits a sphere of autonomous individual sovereignty based
on a fundamental conception of the individual as an autonomous
agent worthy of respect. Immanuel Kant's moral and political
philosophy, and systems derived from it, are premised on treating
the individual as an autonomous, rational decisionmaker able to
38. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (0. Piest ed., 1957).
For Bentham's theory of utilitarianism, see JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON
THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (J. Burns & H. Hart eds.,
1977); BENTHAM, supra note 31.
39. MILL, supra note 32, at 9.
40. Id. at 104.
1714 [Vol. 37: p. 1705
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reason and make choices. 41 In this conception, morality dictates
that the individual be treated as an autonomous person able to
engage in rational reflection about rules.42 Kant's theory asserts
that individuals must be treated as persons capable of rational
choices, as ends in themselves, rather than merely as a means to
the achievement of others' ends. According to this view, there is
a natural, inalienable right to be treated as a person, as one whose
individual autonomy is respected. 43 It would therefore be wrong
for others, including the state, to attempt to choose what is a fit-
ting life for the individual; rather, individuals must be left free to
make important choices for themselves.
B. Constitutional Protection for Autonomy
1. Substantive Due Process Protection of Personal Choice in Matters
Vitally Affecting the Individual
a. The Development of Substantive Due Process Protection for
Self-Determination
These principles of individual autonomy were absorbed into
American legal theory and ultimately constitutionalized in the
doctrine of substantive due process. The Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits the federal government
from depriving any person of life, liberty or property without
"due process of law,"' 44 was originally thought of as providing
procedural protections only.45 However, the concept of due pro-
41. See KANT, supra note 31, at 59-67 (viewing autonomy as basis of morality
and concluding that all rational beings are endowed with free will); see also
DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 3-33; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 31, at 15-
16, 93; RAWLS, supra note 31, at 513-20 (concluding that "a well ordered society
affirms the autonomy of persons"); RICHARDS, supra note 31, at 79; WOLFF, supra
note 31, at 14; Morris, supra note 31, at 485.
42. KANT, supra note 31, at 59-67
43. See, e.g., Macklin & Sherwin, supra note 31, at 439 (concluding that each
person's inherent autonomy dictates that he or she be treated with dignity and
respect); see also Hill, supra note 31, at 171 (arguing that person's inherent auton-
omy mandates greater equality between sexes); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreward.
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1977)
(concluding that "to be a person ... is to make responsible choices in control-
ling one's destiny); Morris, supra note 31.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
45. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (noting that "despite
the language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments," these clauses have been interpreted to have substantive content");
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 537 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)
(declaring that "the substantive content of the Clause is suggested neither by its
language nor by preconstitutional history"); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280 (1856) (interpreting Due Pro-
cess Clauses as having only procedural meaning); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN,
1992] 1715
11
Winick: On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
1716 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 1705
cess gradually was expanded, particularly after the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,46 to protect substantive lib-
erty and property interests from arbitrary governmental depriva-
tion. 47 Moreover, although the common law understanding of
the term "liberty" within the Due Process Clause was limited to
freedom from physical restraint,48 this concept was gradually ex-
THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY 95 (1934) (stating that "no one ... had ever suggested that the term
'due process of law' had any other than its anciently established and self-evident
meaning of correct procedure"); ELY, supra note 30, at 15, 18 (1980) (asserting
that "there is simply no avoiding the fact that the word that follows 'due' is
'process' "); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 35-36 (1958) (noting that
when Due Process Clause first appeared in Chapter III of 28th of Edward III, it
"was regarded as the equivalent of the phrase 'per legem terrae,' which meant no
more than customary legal procedure"); ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN
SUPREME COURT 116 (1960) (stating that "the due process clause.., had usually
been interpreted as having only a procedural meaning"); NOWAK ET AL., supra
note 22, at 336 (noting that "the early American legal theorists' idea of due
process focused on the procedural feature of the concept"); BENJAMIN R. Twlss,
LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME
COURT 26 (1942) (noting Due Process Clause was almost "universally" consid-
ered as "only a procedural guarantee"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due
Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 95-102 (discussing antecedents of constitutional
right to substantive due process); Charles G. Hainesjudicial Review of Legislation
in the United States and the Doctrine of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations on Legisla-
tures, 3 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1924) (examining early interpretations of right to due
process of law); Walton H. Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, in AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 129, 132-33 (Leonard W. Levy ed.,
1966) (same); Henkin, supra note 6, at 1412 (concluding that neither text nor
history of Due Process Clause suggests a substantive component); Charles M.
Hough, Due Process of Law--Today, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218, 223-24 (1919) (inter-
preting due process rights as they existed prior to civil war); Michael J. Perry,
Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power. The Ethical Function of Substantive Due
Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 695 (1976) (concluding that it is "received wis-
dom" that original meaning of due process was solely procedural); John Paul
Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 277, 278 (1986) (observ-
ing that "the plain language of the due process clause seems to speak only of
procedure").
46. The Fourteenth Amendment, among other things, provides: "No state
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
47. Hough, supra note 45, at 222-23 (tracing development of due process
before Civil War); Charles E. Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in
Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty and Prop-
erty, " 4 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1891) (tracing development of due process from
framing of Constitution to late nineteenth century); Charles Warren, The New
"Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 440 (1926) (dis-
cussing development of due process up to 1926).
48. See A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 305-07 (1968) (noting due process of law
was thought to "secure the individual from the arbitrary exercises of the powers
of government); Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the
Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 373-74 (1911) (noting that due process of law
prohibits legislature from passing "arbitrary" or "harsh" laws); Howard J. Gra-
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panded to include a variety of economic and personal liberties.49
ham, Procedure to Substance-Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 1830-1860, 40 CAL.
L. REV. 483, 486 (1952) (noting that Due Process Clause was originally intended
to protect "persons" from restraints on "liberty" and that its framers "scarcely
dreamed" that it would be used to overturn social or economic regulations);
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 716
(1975) (discussing original judicial interpretations of due process as "natural-
rights" constitutional theory); Wallace Mendelson, A Missing Link in the Evolution
of Due Process, 10 VAND. L. REV. 125, 126 (1956) (asserting that "orthodox due
process meant that government could not punish, or 'go against' a person ex-
cept in a procedurally proper manner"); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the
Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America,
87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 525-66 (1974) (discussing importance of due process to
antislavery jurisprudence as constitutional protection of "personal liberty" and
"human rights"); Perry, supra note 45, at 695, 698-99 n.50 (noting that natural
rights interpretations of word "liberty" in Fourteenth Amendment was key force
in "development of substantive due process"); Stephen F. Williams, "Liberty" in
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: The Framers' Intentions,
53 U. CoLO. L. REV. 117, 118 (1981) (discussing evolution of interpretation of
Due Process Clause from protection of essential civil rights to protection of "a
broad range of liberties"). See generally JACOBUS TEN BROECK, THE ANTISLAVERY
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951) (tracing development of judi-
cial interpretations of "liberty" interests protected by Due Process Clause).
49. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Meyer Court
stated:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some
of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.
Id. at 399. The Court's decision in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, also reflects the
modern, broader interpretation of substantive due process rights. In Moore, the
Court examined the constitutionality of a local ordinance that effectively prohib-
ited a grandmother from living with her grandson in the same dwelling unit.
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-96 (1977). The Court noted
that " '[t]his Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in mat-
ters of ... family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' " Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)). The Court held that the ordinance vio-
lated the right to due process. Id. at 506.
Similarly, in Ingraham v. Wright, the court construed the Due Process Clause
to provide rights beyond the right to be free from bodily restraint. In Ingraham,
the Court addressed the consitutionality of a Florida statute and regulations
promulgated thereunder that permitted teachers to administer corporal punish-
ment after consulting with the principal. Although the Court upheld the consi-
tutionality of Florida's statute and regulations, the Court noted that "[t]he
liberty preserved from deprivation without due process included the right 'gen-
erally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.' " Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 673 (1977) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). Thus,
the Court recognized that the Due Process Clause protects rights beyond the
right to be free from bodily restraint. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
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The Supreme Court has construed the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment not only to incorporate virtually all
of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, 50 but also to pro-
tect liberty interests not specifically enumerated in the Constitu-
tion. The Court has expressed the view that the Framers believed
that "the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution."-5' As
the Court has indicated, "[i]n a constitution for free people, there
564, 572 (1972) ("Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract . (quoting
dicta in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))).
The freedom of contract referred to by the Court in Roth became a device
by which a conservative Supreme Court, reflecting a nineteenth century concep-
tion of laissez-faire capitalism, invalidated repeated attempts by Congress and
the state legislatures to enact social and economic legislation. See, e.g., Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating as unconstitutional statute that
prevented bakers from working more than sixty hours per week and ten hours
per day), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For a
general discussion of the Lochner doctrine, see Frank R. Strong, The Economic
Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure, and Emasculation, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 419
(1973). The Court has now disavowed the use of substantive due process to
champion economic and property rights against social and economic legislation.
See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (observing that Lochner doc-
trine has long been discarded); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955) (same); Day-Bright Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)
(same); see also Strong, supra, at 449-54 (same).
However, the doctrine continues to have vitality in the area of noneconomic
liberties. GUNTHER, supra note 22, at 406; Henkin, supra note 6, at 1427; Perry,
supra note 45, at 704-06. For a discussion of the doctrine's continued vitality,
see infra notes 58-155 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) ("declaring that
many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution
have been held to be protected against state action by the Due Process
Clause."); see also GUNTHER, supra note 22, at 405 (noting that "virtually all of the
procedural requirements that govern federal criminal law enforcement" have
been incorporated); TRIBE, supra note 22, § 11-2, at 772-77 (collecting cases
holding that certain protections of Bill of Rights are incorporated within Due
Process Clause).
51. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (quoting Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting)). See generally 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 715-16
(1833) (explaining that the "Bill of Rights presumes the existence of a substan-
tial body of rights not specifically enumerated but easily perceived in the broad
concept of liberty and so numerous and so obvious as to preclude listing them");
TRIBE, supra note 22, § 11-2, at 774-77. This broad conception of due process as
extending to the protection of unenumerated rights is also supported by the text
of the Ninth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX. For the relevant lan-
guage of the Ninth Amendment, see supra note 30. The debates on ratification
of the Constitution also support a broad interpretation of due process rights.
See ELY, supra note 30, at 34-41; Levy, supra note 22, at 258, 282 (setting forth
James Madison's arguments); David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and
Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 840-42 (1986).
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can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad
indeed."
52
Early recognition of the notion that substantive due process
protects individual self-determination regarding important deci-
sions came in Justice Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House
Cases,53 decided in 1873, five years after the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's adoption. Justice Bradley's opinion suggested that due
process protected the right of occupational choice, and could be
invoked to attack as arbitrary a regulation of slaughterhouses that
created a butchers' monopoly in the city of New Orleans. In
1888, the Court accepted, in dicta, the notion that "the privilege
of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade" is a protected liberty
guaranteed by due process. 54 The Supreme Court ultimately
adopted in 1897 the principle that the term "liberty" in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes occupa-
tional choice in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.55 Such liberty, the Court
held, included the individual's right "to be free in the enjoyment
of all his faculties," including the right "to use them in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; [and] to pursue any livelihood or avocation." 56
Although the states may regulate occupational matters in the pub-
lic interest, such as by adopting reasonable educational or experi-
ential requirements or rules governing safety and health in the
work place,57 the Constitution leaves individuals substantially free
52. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
53. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 122 (1873); see also Butcher's Union v. Crescent
City Co., Ill U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("The right to fol-
low any of the common occupations of life... is a large ingredient in the civil
liberty of the citizen."). By this time, Judge Cooley, the most influential consti-
tutional scholar of the period, had written that "the liberty protected by due
process included the right of the individual to choose his own employment."
THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 231 (1978 ed.).
54. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888) (dicta).
55. 165 U.S. 578, 593 (1897); see also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915)
(concluding that individuals have "the right to work for a living in the common
occupation of the community").
56. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
57. To comport with substantive due process, conditions or other qualifica-
tions imposed by occupational licensing schemes must bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the competency of the individual to engage in the occupation in
question. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)
(holding that state law requirement that bar applicants must be of good "moral
character" is reasonably related to individual's competency to serve as attorney;
therefore, law comports with substantive due process); Douglas v. Noble, 261
U.S. 165, 168 (1923) (utilizing rational basis review and holding dentistry licens-
ing scheme constitutional); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1889)
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to choose the area of work in which they wish to engage, or in-
deed, to choose not to work at all. The notion that the state could
require an individual to work in a particular field or in a particular
job, at least absent a wartime draft, would be inconsistent with
individuals' basic right to chart their own destiny.
After Allgeyer, the Court gradually broadened the meaning
and application of the term "liberty." In 1900, the Court found
that liberty included "the right of locomotion, the right to remove
from one place to another, according to inclination." 58 Ameri-
cans, unlike citizens of some other countries, may choose for
themselves, without government intrusion, where to travel or to
reside. 59
In the 1905 compulsory vaccination case, Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts,60 the Court recognized the existence of "a sphere within
which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will"
against government interference. 6' The Court recognized that
the state's police power interest in legislating to protect the pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare could justify interfering with the in-
dividual's sphere of autonomy, for instance, by acting to prevent
the threat of epidemic. However, the Court implied that absent
the assertion of such a weighty public interest, the individual's
will would be left free from governmental interference. 62
(utilizing rational basis review and holding medical licensing scheme
constitutional).
58. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
59. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (invalidating state distri-
bution of public funds to citizens in varying amounts based upon length of resi-
dence within the state); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972)
(invalidating, as penalty on right to travel, law requiring individuals to reside in
state for one year before such individuals could vote); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (invalidating durational residency requirement for wel-
fare as impermissible restriction on fundamental right to travel); Edwards v. Cal-
ifornia, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (invalidating California statute that
criminalized act of knowingly bringing or assisting to bring nonresident "indi-
gent" persons into California); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 35-36
(1867) (invalidating Nevada statute that imposed tax on railroad based upon
each passenger railroad transported out of state); cf Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975) (upholding one-year residency requirement for divorce as not interfering
with right to relocate from one state to another).
The Court has also recognized a liberty interest in the right to foreign
travel. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964) (noting that
"freedom of travel" is a constitutional liberty); Kent v. Dulles 357 U.S. 116, 125-
26 (1958) (stating in dicta that "[tihe right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of
which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment").
60. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
61. Id. at 29.
62. Id.
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Although control over one's own bodily integrity, an issue raised
in the compulsory vaccination case, is not absolute, it is presump-
tively protected by the Constitution. Indeed, as early as 1891, the
Supreme Court noted that this principle was deeply rooted in the
common law, stating that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law."
63
In a more recent series of cases, the Court has recognized the
"right to personal security" to be an "historic liberty interest"
protected by due process. In these cases, the Court has found the
right to be implicated by administering corporal punishment in
school;64 subjecting residents of mental retardation facilities to
unsafe conditions;65 imposing punitive incarceration without an
adjudication of guilt; 66 transferring prisoners to a mental hospital
where they would receive "[c]ompelled treatment in the form of
mandatory behavior modification programs"; 67 and forcible ad-
ministration of antipsychotic medication to a state prisoner and to
a criminal defendant during trial.
68
b. Protection for Self-Determination in the Areas of Marriage,
Family, and Procreation
An important area of individual freedom involves marriage
and the family. In a variety of contexts, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the Constitution allows the individual to decide
whether or not to marry and that the Constitution prohibits the
states from imposing unreasonable burdens on this decision.
69
63. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v, Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891). In its most
recent treatment of the issue, the Court stated that "[f]reedom from bodily re-
straint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the due process
clause from arbitrary governmental action." Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct.
1780, 1785 (1992).
64. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
65. Youngberg v. Romeo, 451 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982).
66. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785-86 (addressing due process rights of defend-
ants aquitted by reason of insanity); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16
(1979) (addressing in dicta due process rights in context of punishing pretrial
detainees).
67. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980).
68. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (during pretrial and trial
phase); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (during imprisonment).
69. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (concluding that Missouri
prison regulation, which permitted inmates to marry only if prison superinten-
dent concluded that there were "compelling reasons" to do so, impermissibly
interfered with inmates' constitutional right to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
19921 1721
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Unlike in some countries, in which marriages may be arranged, in
the United States the decision of whether to marry and the choice
of a spouse are questions reserved for individual choice. In Meyer
v. Nebraska 70 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,7 1 the forerunners of
modern constitutional privacy doctrine, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the sphere of individual sovereignty protected by
due process includes the right "to marry, establish a home and
bring up children. ' 72 The Court has held that due process pro-
tects a significant degree of parental authority over child rearing,
including the right of parents "to direct the upbringing and edu-
cation of [their] children."
73
These cases recognize a "private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter."7 4 The Platonic notion that the state
U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating Wisconsin statute that required resident to prove
compliance with child support obligations before resident could marry); Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that state statute that required
payment of court costs as prerequisite to obtaining divorce violated due pro-
cess); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that prohibition on interra-
cial marriages is unconstitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(noting in dicta that "liberty" guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment encom-
passes the right to marry).
70. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, a parochial school teacher challenged a
Nebraska statute that made it unlawful to teach foreign languages to students
who had not yet passed the eighth grade. Id. at 396-97. The teacher had been
convicted for teaching German to a ten-year-old child. Id. at 396. The Court
determined that the Nebraska statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 402. In its analysis, the Court noted that the "liberty" guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment encompassed the teacher's right to teach and the par-
ents' right to engage a foreign language instructor for their children. Id. at 400.
Accordingly, the Court found that the state had impermissibly interfered with
those protected rights. Id. at 402.
71. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierce involved a challenge to Oregon's Compul-
sory Education Act, which required every person having custody of a school-
aged child to send the child "to a public school for the period of time a public
school shall be held" during the year. Id. at 530. A parochial school challenged
the Act, asserting that the Act interfered with "the rights of parents to choose
schools," "the right of the child to influence the parent's choice," and the right
of teachers to engage in their profession. Id. at 532. The Court held that the
Act impermissibly interfered with "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control." Id. at 534-35.
72. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
73. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
74. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). In Prince, Sarah
Prince challenged a Massachusetts statute that made it unlawful for minors to
sell "articles or merchandise" in public places and also made it unlawful for
guardians of the minors to permit the minors to violate this law. Id. at 161.
Prince, aJehovah's Witness, was convicted for furnishing her nine-year-old niece
with religious literature to sell on the streets. Id. at 160. Prince argued that the
statute violated her "freedom of religion under the First Amendment" and her
"parental right" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 164. Although the
Court recognized a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,"
the Court stated that the family "is not beyond regulation in the public interest."
18
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could take over the raising of children in the interests of the re-
public 75 is quite inconsistent with our constitutional vision.
Although the state may require compulsory education of children,
parents may choose to fulfill that requirement by placing their
children in private schools, 76 and the state may neither restrict
what parents teach their children nor otherwise interfere with
"the right of parents to engage in suitable education of their chil-
dren." 77 The state unquestionably has a compelling interest in
protecting and promoting children's health and welfare, but in
the absence of a showing that parents have neglected or abused
their children, these matters are left by the Constitution primarily
to the family, which is deemed presumptively best able to make
decisions regarding children. 7s
Although "privacy" is not mentioned in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution protects a
zone of personal privacy within which autonomous decisionmak-
ing, at least in certain areas, is shielded from governmental intru-
sion absent compelling justification. In a number of significant
cases, the Court has upheld a privacy interest "in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions." 79 This notion of
constitutional privacy was recognized by the Court in Justice
Douglas' seminal opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.8 0 The Court,
in striking down a state statutory ban on the sale of contracep-
tives, found a right of privacy, grounded in "penumbras, formed
by emanations" from several constitutional provisions that pro-
tected the marital relationship.8'
Although Justice Douglas had previously developed the con-
Id. at 666. The Court concluded that the state's interest in regulating child labor
justified the statute, and, accordingly, rejected Prince's constitutional claims. Id.
at 168-69.
75. For Plato's theory that the state should be entitled to take over a child's
upbringing when it would be in the state's interest to do so, see generally PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1986).
76. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
77. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
78. See, e.g., Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (holding that primary care, custody and
control of children rests with parents); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03
(1979) (concluding that courts are to presume that parents act in child's best
interest).
79. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 & 600 n.26 (1977) (not-
ing in footnote that these decisions concern " 'matters relating to marriage, pro-
creation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education' ").
80. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
81. Id. at 484.
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cept of the right of privacy in his lectures and writings,8 2 the ori-
gins of the right can be traced to Justice Brandeis. In an
influential article written many years before his appointment to
the United States Supreme Court, Brandeis championed "the
right to be let alone."' 83 Justice Brandeis later treated this right as
constitutionally based, 84 but it was not until Griswold that the
Court recognized it as a constitutional principle. 85 By holding
that the Constitution left the decision whether to use contracep-
tives to those principally affected by that decision-the married
couple-the Court in Griswold not only protected the privacy and
intimacy of the marital bedroom, but also recognized the auton-
omy of the individual in an important area of personal life. In
addition, the Court adopted strict scrutiny as the standard of re-
view for deciding the constitutionality of statutory intrusions on
this right of marital privacy. Using a standard applied in the con-
text of the First Amendment freedom of association, the Court
invoked the "familiar principle" that governmental purposes
"may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.."86
Eisenstadt v. Baird87 demonstrated that the Court's holding in
82. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 87-91 (1st ed.
1958) (discussing constitutional "right to be let alone" as derived from First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments).
83. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890) (asserting that "the right to life has come to mean the right
to enjoy life .... the right to be let alone").
84. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("The makers of our Constitution ... conferred, as against the Gov-
ernment, the right to be let alone, [which is] the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.").
85. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. In Griswold, the Court used the rubric of
privacy and avoided speaking directly about substantive due process because
substantive due process had become associated with the discredited Lochner doc-
trine. GRAHAM HUGHS, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT 72 (1975); Helen Gar-
field, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61
WASH. L. REV. 293, 306 & n.82 (1986); Henkin, supra note 6, at 1427-28; Perry,
supra note 45, at 705. The right of privacy recognized by Griswold, however, is
properly understood as an aspect of "liberty," protected by substantive due pro-
cess. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); id. at 168 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); see also Harrah Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 196 (1979); Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599 n.23 (1977); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976).
86. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288,
307 (1964)). Under the Griswold standard, the government must employ the
least restrictive means to accomplish its end. See id. Moreover, the end must be
"compelling." See id. The Court also had previously applied such a stringent
standard in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964) (right to
travel).
87. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Griswold involved individual autonomy rather than merely defer-
ence to the marital relationship. In Eisenstadt, the Court held that
a statute permitting distribution of contraceptives to married but
not unmarried persons was unconstitutional. 88 The Court stated
that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 89 It would be
constitutionally unthinkable for a state to require its citizens to
procreate, no matter how essential to the survival of the society
this may be. Nor may a state, in order to deal with the problem of
overpopulation, enforce a policy of "zero population growth" by
placing limits on the number of children an individual may have.
Although it may be permissible constitutionally for the state to
provide education designed to achieve such policies, or even eco-
nomic subsidies or disincentives, in our society the ultimate deci-
sion on these matters is left by the Constitution to the individual.
This principle of constitutional privacy has been applied to
protect individual autonomy over a variety of matters touching on
marriage and procreation. In Cleveland Board of Education v. La-
Fleur,90 the Court protected a woman's choice to have children
from a governmental regulation that unduly penalized that choice
by preventing her from working as a school teacher following the
seventh month of her pregnancy. The Court invalidated
mandatory maternity leave rules such as the Cleveland policy that
conclusively presumed occupational inability without permitting
the pregnant woman an opportunity to demonstrate her contin-
ued ability to work. In this decision, the Court reiterated that it
had long recognized the principle that "freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'' 91
88. Id. at 453-54; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977) (applying Griswold to invalidate ban on sale of contraceptives to minors).
89. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
90. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
91. Id. at 639-40; accord Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-85 & n.10
(1978) (concluding that right of privacy protects individual's decision whether or
not to marry); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977) (concluding that right of privacy exists with respect to
family life); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (same); see
also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (concluding that there exists
"freedom of choice with respect to certain basic matters of procreation, mar-
riage, and family life").
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c. Protection for Abortion Decisions
One of the most significant applications of the right to pri-
vacy/autonomy is the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v.
Wade,92 declaring that the decision to have an abortion is within
the protected zone of constitutional privacy. 93 In Roe, the Court
explicitly acknowledged that the right of privacy was protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 and this
right of privacy was deemed "broad enough to encompass a wo-
man's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 95
The Court stressed the serious detrimental consequences that
would result from denying this choice to the pregnant woman:
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even
in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or addi-
tional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful
life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologi-
cally and otherwise, to care for it.96
Although these considerations led the Court to find that the
right of privacy with regard to the abortion decision was "funda-
mental," the Court declined to treat it as an "absolute" right, not-
ing that even fundamental constitutional rights must yield to
governmental regulation in appropriate circumstances.9 7 As in
Griswold, however, the Court employed a strict scrutiny standard
of review. The Court insisted that to meet this standard, any reg-
ulation of the abortion decision must advance a "compelling state
interest," and "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legiti-
mate state interest at stake." 98
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe involved a class action challenge to a Texas
abortion law that criminalized abortions unless the abortions were performed to
save the mother's life. Id. at 117-18. The Court held that the Texas statute
impermissibly infringed on a woman's "right of privacy." Id. at 153.
93. Id. at 153.
94. Id. (referring to "the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal lib-
erty and restrictions upon state action").
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 155.
98. Id. at 155-56. In the Court's view, the fetus is not viable, and thus is not
a "person" during the first trimester of pregnancy. See id. at 163. Further, dur-
ing the first trimester, the medical risks of abortion to women are no greater
1726 [Vol. 37: p. 1705
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In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
a highly politicized case concerning the abortion controversy, the
Court re-endorsed the principle of privacy/autonomy, stating that
"the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private
sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach
of government." 99 Broadly reaffirming Roe, the Court explained
the importance of the abortion decision to the woman involved:
Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more
properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and
autonomy than a woman's decision ... whether to end
her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice
freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our view,
would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere
of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all. 100
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens described the impor-
tance of the decision faced by the pregnant woman as "a difficult
choice having serious and personal consequences of major impor-
tance to her own future."' 0' In a ringing endorsement of auton-
omy values, Justice Stevens noted that Roe stands for the
presumption "that it is far better to permit some individuals to
make incorrect decisions than to deny all individuals the right to
make decisions that have a profound affect upon their destiny."'10 2
As the composition of the Court changed in recent years,
transforming the Court into a significantly more conservative in-
stitution than it had been in several generations, the Roe decision
appeared to be in jeopardy of being overturned. The retirement
of several of the Court's most liberal members and the interjec-
tion of anti-abortion politics into the nomination process made it
appear possible that the new Court might deconstitutionalize the
than those of childbirth. See id. Based upon these premises, the Court con-
cluded that the state interest cannot outweigh the woman's interest, and she
therefore is free to make the abortion decision without state interference. Id. at
164. During the second trimester, when the medical risks of abortion increase,
the state's interest in maternal health justifies some regulation of the abortion
process, but the woman must still be left free to make the decision. See id. Fi-
nally, in the third trimester, when the child can live outside the mother's womb
and thus becomes a "person" in the constitutional sense, the state's interest in
the life of the child becomes sufficiently compelling to justify prohibiting abor-
tion. See id. at 164-65.
99. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring).
102. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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abortion question, leaving it to state regulation. In cases decided
over the last several years, an increasing minority of the Justices
questioned Roe's rejection of the fetus as a "person" within the
protection of the Constitution prior to viability.' 0 3 Because this
constitutional premise supported Roe's conclusion that the state's
interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus could not be
considered compelling prior to that time, this questioning
threatened to undermine the balance struck in Roe.
The much heralded reconsideration of Roe finally occurred in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.10 4 In Casey, the Court reaffirmed the
central holding of Roe, but a majority of the Justices rejected Roe's
trimester approach and recast its standard of scrutiny of statutes
regulating abortion. The Court's decision was splintered into five
separate opinions. In an opinion that was unusual for the Court
in that it was co-authored by several Justices (Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter), the Court abandoned the trimester frame-
work as a "rigid prohibition on all pre-viability regulation aimed
at the protection of fetal life."' 10 5 This opinion rejected the no-
tion that the state's interest in the life of the fetus prior to viability
was nonexistent; rather, it characterized the state's interest in the
potential life of the fetus as being "substantial" and "profound"
throughout the period of pregnancy.' 0 6 Nonetheless, however
significant this state interest might be, in the view of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, state regulation of the abortion
decision in the pre-viability phase that place an "undue burden"
on the woman's free choice concerning the abortion decision are
unconstitutional. 
07
103. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989)
(plurality opinion); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
state's interest, if compelling after viability is equally compelling before viabil-
ity."); id. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Re-
productive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality
opinion); cf. Roe, 410 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
105. Id. at 2818.
106. Id. at 2820-21.
107. Id. at 2820. "An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law
is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of
the woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Id. at 2821.
To promote the States's profound interest in potential life, throughout
pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman's
choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest
would not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the
woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must not
be an undue burden on the right.
Id. "As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further
1728 [Vol. 37: p. 1705
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These three Justices would replace Roe's trimester analysis
with an undue burden test, but in their view, the adoption of this
test "does not disturb the central holding of Roe," which they ex-
plicitly reaffirmed.' 0 8 Under that "central holding," a state "may
not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to ter-
minate her pregnancy before viability."' 0 9 In addition, this opin-
ion reaffirmed Roe's holding that "subsequent to viability, the
State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother."' 10
Although disagreeing with the joint opinion's adoption of an
undue burden test, Justices Blackmun and Stevens, in separate
concurring opinions, joined in the joint opinion's reaffirmation of
the central holding of Roe.' Thus, in Casey, a majority of the
the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health regula-
tions that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a
woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right." Id.
Although upholding a facial attack on the constitutionality of several of the
Pennsylvania statute's regulations on the abortion decision, the opinion left
open for future decision the question of whether the statute, as applied, unduly
burdened the woman's choice.
108. Id. at 2821.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
111. Id. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "In
counterpoise is the woman's constitutional interest in liberty. One aspect of this
liberty is a right to bodily integrity, a right to control one's person." Id. at 2840
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). "The
woman's constitutional interest also involves her freedom to decide matters of
the highest privacy and the most personal nature." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). "A woman considering abor-
tion faces 'a difficult choice having serious and personal consequences of major
importance to her own future - perhaps to the salvation of her own immortal
soul.'" Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Similarly, Justice Blackmun concluded that
[diecisional autonomy must limit the State's power to inject into a wo-
man's most personal deliberations its own views of what is best. The
State may promote its preferences by funding childbirth, by creating
and maintaining alternatives to abortion, and by espousing the virtues
of family; but it must respect the individual's freedom to make such
judgments.
Id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment, and dis-
senting in part). "[Plersonal decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity,
identity, and destiny should be largely beyond the reach of government." Id. at
2846 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment, and dissenting
in part). "Because motherhood has a dramatic impact on a woman's educational
prospects, employment opportunities, and self-determination, restrictive abor-
tion laws deprive her of basic control over her life." Id. (Blackmun, J., concur-
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Justices re-endorsed constitutional protection for the pregnant
woman's autonomy over the abortion decision. Four of the Jus-
tices, in two separately authored dissenting opinions, wanted to
overrule Roe entirely." 1
2
Although it was thought possible that the Court in Casey
would overrule Roe, in fact a majority of five justices broadly reaf-
firmed its central holding. The Court made it clear that, at bot-
tom, Roe's result is dictated by our Constitution's commitment to
the autonomy principle. In the view of a majority of the Justices,
matters involving "the most intimate and personal choices a per-
son may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment." ' 13 In language that has broad implications
for the constitutional protection of autonomy, these Justices
stated: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion
of the State." ' 1
4
However significant a state's interest in protecting the poten-
tial life of the fetus, this interest may not override the woman's
fundamental right to make the abortion decision for herself. The
significance of the abortion decision to the woman who must bear
and raise the child, and the personal health and economic conse-
quences to her, make this most intimate and personal decision
one that she is uniquely qualified to make and one that is best left
ring in part, concurring in judgment, and dissenting in part). For these reasons,
Justice Blackmun concluded, " 'the decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child' lies at 'the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected
choices.' " Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment, and
dissenting in part) (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 685
(1977)).
112. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part); id. at 2873 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dissent recognized that the woman's
decision whether to have an abortion was a liberty interest, although not a fun-
damental liberty interest. Accordingly, in his view, the states may regulate the
abortion decision in ways that are rationally related to any legitimate state inter-
est. See id at 2867 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part). Injustice Scalia's view, by contrast, the woman's ability to choose
abortion is not a liberty interest within the protection of the Constitution at all.
See id. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
113. Id. at 2807; see also id. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); id. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment, and dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 2807.
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to her if we are to be consistent in our constitutional commitment
to individual autonomy. Even though protection of the potential
life of the fetus may be a substantial state interest, it inevitably
clashes with the woman's freedom to control her body and her
own future. These interests simply cannot be reconciled, and on
balance, the woman's fundamental right to determine the course
of her very existence must predominate over the interests of the
fetus that, prior to viability, lacks the capacity for independent
existence.' 15
Constitutionally, the state may attempt to influence a wo-
man's decision or to encourage her not to have an abortion," 6
but the decision should ultimately rest with the woman, the per-
son most vitally affected. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, long an
opponent of the right to choose an abortion, acknowledged in his
dissent in Roe that the state's interest in protecting the potential
life of the fetus would not justify a statutory ban on abortion in
which the life of the woman was injeopardy." 7 Being required to
carry and bear an unwanted child would be so devastating to the
woman compelled to do so, and would affect her life and that of
the child so dramatically, that the balance should tilt in favor of
the woman's right to choose even when the woman's life is not
literally at risk. The state should not be able to impose the sub-
stantial burdens of unwanted pregnancy and childbirth upon a
woman, making her body an instrument of social policy.
The state cannot subject an individual to a surgical proce-
dure that would remove a vital organ for the purpose of trans-
planting the organ into the body of another citizen who needed it
115. See Ruth B. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation
to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 383 (1985) (asserting that abortion deci-
sion involves "a woman's autonomous charge of her full life's course"); Karst,
supra note 43, at 58 (stating that abortion decision involves "a right to take re-
sponsibility for choosing one's own future").
116. The Supreme Court has stated:
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a pro-
tected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity conso-
nant with legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest when
the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to
encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far
broader.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977) (footnotes omitted); accord Webster
v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S 490, 511 (1989); see also Rust v. Sullivan,
111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
117. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The wisdom (if not the constitutionality) of the state's attempting to influence
the abortion decision, through, for example, the denial of Medicaid funding,
may be seriously questioned.
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to live and is deemed more worthy by the state. For example,
even though individuals can survive with only one of their two
kidneys, the state cannot mandate the removal of an individual's
kidney to save the life of another. Similarly, as between the state
and the individual, the abortion choice should be left to the wo-
man, whose body and future life are dramatically affected by this
most personal and intimate of decisions. It is therefore appropri-
ate that this important area of individual autonomy was left sub-
stantially undisturbed by the Supreme Court in Casey. 118
d. Protection for Health Care Decisionmaking
The Supreme Court has only recently recognized that sub-
stantive due process protects the right to make personal health
decisions."l 9 Like other constitutionally protected autonomy
118. The question of whether a fetus is a "person" is not, of course, a sci-
entific question. Rather, it is a metaphysical one. It turns more on conceptions
of morality or religion than on fact. Although courts may not be well-equipped
to determine such moral or religious questions, neither are legislatures. Like
matters of morality and religion generally, the Constitution should be construed
to leave the abortion question to the individual. The First Amendment, by
prohibiting government from establishing any religion, disqualifies religious
objectives from serving as justifications for intrusions on liberty. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I. Secular objectives, of course, may often overlap with religious ones,
in which case a legislative attempt to effectuate such a secular purpose will not
offend the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1960) (holding that statute prohibiting retail sales on Sundays did not consti-
tute law "respecting an establishment of religion"); Two Guys From Harrison-
Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1960) (same). However, to the ex-
tent that a state attempts to ban abortion based on an essentially religious con-
ception of when life begins, this ban would infringe upon the First Amendment's
principle of separation of church and state. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791, 2839 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (declaring that "consistent with the First Amendment the State may not
promote a theological or sectarian interest"). The difficult choices faced by a
pregnant woman in deciding whether to have an abortion are essentially a mat-
ter of conscience reserved by the Constitution to the individual. In our system,
government-imposed orthodoxy in matters of morals and religion is constitu-
tionally intolerable. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1944) (holding that state may not compel public school students to salute
flag).
119. See Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (concluding that Due
Process Clause protects criminal defendant's interest in avoiding involuntary ad-
ministration of antipsychotic drugs); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-
22 (1990) (acknowledging that criminal defendant possessed "a significant lib-
erty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Cruzan v. Di-
rector, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (concluding that
competent person has constitutionally protected interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment). Similarly, in Doe v. Bolton, a companion case to Roe, Justice
Douglas referred to "the freedom to care for one's health and person" as being
a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (Douglas,J., concurring).
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rights, the right to self-determination in matters of personal
health is deeply rooted in our constitutional traditions. The right
is an outgrowth of the "historic liberty interest" in "personal se-
curity" and bodily integrity. 120 In the 1905 case ofJacobson v.
Massachusetts, although the Court upheld compulsory vaccination
for smallpox against a claim that it violated the liberty of every
person "to care for his own body and health in such way as to him
seems best,"'12 1 the Court treated the claim seriously. The Court
considered the vaccination to be routine and noted that no claim
had been made that it presented any risk to the petitioner's
health. The Court suggested that the result might be different if
the vaccination would seriously impair the petitioner's health. 122
Absent any evidence that the individual's health would be ad-
versely affected by the vaccination, the state's police power inter-
est in protecting the public health from the spread of a highly
contagious disease justified interference in what otherwise would
be an area preserved by the Constitution for individual self-
determination.
The common law origins of this right of the individual to ex-
120. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (noting that "among
the historic liberties so protected was a right to be free from . . .unjustified
intrusions on personal security"); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
252 (1891) (holding that court may not order plaintiff to submit to pretrial surgi-
cal examination); cf Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that noncon-
sensual surgical removal of bullet would violate Fourth Amendment's ban on
unreasonable searches and seizures).
Lower courts have also frequently found a right to refuse treatment
grounded in a liberty interest in "bodily integrity, personal security and per-
sonal dignity." Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823, 825 (4th Cir. 1984); Lujak v.
Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1067 (1986);
Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 652 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rog-
ers, 457 U.S. 291, 306 (1982); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 n.9 (3d Cir.
1976), vacated, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982); Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F.
Supp. 1026, 1032 (D.D.C. 1983); Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298,
1309 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983); Davis v. Hubbard, 506
F. Supp. 915, 930 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144
(D.N.J. 1978); Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 399, 406 (Ariz. 1986); Rogers
v. Commissioner, 458 N.E.2d 314 (Mass. 1983); Opinion of the Justices, 465
A.2d 484, 488 (N.H. 1983); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1980).
121. 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905); For further discussion of Jacobson, see supra
text accompanying notes 60-62.
122. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29. Compare Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 771 (1966) (finding compulsory blood test of suspected intoxicated driver
to be "routine" and to involve "virtually no risk, trauma, or pain" and thus up-
holding compulsory blood test against Fourth Amendment attack) with Winston,
470 U.S. at 761, 765-66 (finding surgical removal of bullet from criminal sus-
pect's body for use as evidence to be "severe" intrusion presenting disputed
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ercise control over health care have been recognized frequently.
Almost eighty years ago,Justice Cardozo, then a judge serving on
the New York Court of Appeals, memorialized the right to make
personal health decisions in language that has been quoted often:
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits
an assault for which he is liable in damages."' 23 Case law devel-
oping the informed consent doctrine as a device to protect the
patient's right to refuse treatment has grounded the right in the
common law's deference to individual autonomy:
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-
going self-determination. It follows that each man is
considered to be master of his own body and he may, if
he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance
of life saving surgery, or other medical treatment. A
doctor might well believe that an operation or form of
treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not
permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the
patient. 124
Basic principles of tort law have embraced this principle of
informed consent in order to vindicate a patient's control over
decisions affecting his or her own health. 125 Absent an emer-
gency or incompetency, the individual must voluntarily consent
123. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
In Schloendorff, a surgeon was held liable for assault when the surgeon removed a
fibroid tumor from the patient while the patient was unconscious. Id. In an-
other state court opinion from this period, the Oklahoma Supreme Court re-
ferred to "the free citizen's first and greatest right . .. -the right to the
inviolability of his person," and therefore forbade a physician "to violate without
permission the bodily integrity of his patient." Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 97
(Okla. 1913).
124. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d, 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960); see also Ericson v.
Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ("[lIt is the individual who is the
subject of a medical decision who has the final say and ... this must necessarily
be so in a system of government which gives the greatest possible protection to
the individual in furtherance of his own desires.").
125. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S 261,
269 (1990); see also PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THE-
ORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1981); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 9, 32 (5th ed. 1984); Charles L. Sprung & BruceJ.
Winick, Informed Consent in Theory and Practice: Legal and Medical Perspectives on the
Informed Consent Doctrine, and a Proposed Reconceptualization, 17 CRITICAL CARE MED.
1346 (1989); Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 15-27;
Note, Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1519, 1661 (1990).
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before medical treatment may be administered, and the physician
is required to provide sufficient information so that the choice is
informed. "[T]rue consent to what happens to one's self is the
informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to
evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attend-
ant upon each."' 2 6 The "root premise" of the informed consent
doctrine is the "concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence,
that the individual may control what shall be done with his own
body."' 127 Unless incompetent, the patient's medical decisions
must be respected, no matter how foolish these decisions are
thought to be.'
28
e. The "Right to Die"
An application of the right to make personal health decisions
that has received much recent attention is what has become
known as the "right to die." In In re Quinlan,12 9 the New Jersey
Supreme Court approved the appointment of a parent as guard-
126. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
127. Id.
128. See Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452,
1455 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that competent adult has right to have life-support
system removed even though death will likely result); Bouvia v. Superior Court,
225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that mentally competent
patient has right to refuse nasogastric tube); In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d
435, 442 (Il. 1965) (concluding that, absent a clear and present danger, pa-
tient's refusal to take blood transfusion must be respected even if unwise); Lane
v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (concluding that
irrationality of patient's decision does not justify conclusion that patient is le-
gally incompetent); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 91 (Me. 1974) (acknowl-
edging competent adult's right to refuse treatment or cure, however unwise
adult's sense of values may be to others); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225
(N.J. 1985) (noting that patient's right to informed consent must be respected
even when it conflicts with values of medical profession as whole); In re Quack-
enbush, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (Morris County Ct. 1978) (holding that mentally
competent individual has right to refuse operation involving extensive bodily
invasion even absent dim prognosis); New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v.
Stein, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461, 465 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (concluding that patient not adju-
dicated incompetent may refuse recommended ECT treatment); In re Yetter, 62
Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623 (1973) (concluding that constitutional right of privacy
includes right of mature, competent adult to refuse to accept medical recom-
mendations that may prolong individual's life); see also SAMUELJ. BRAKEL ET AL.,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 340 (3d ed. 1985); FOWLER v. HARPER ET
AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.1, at 562 (2d ed. 1986); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAV. RES., DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
TREATMENT DECISIONS 40 (1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUS-
TAINING TREATMENT]; Perry, A Problem with Refusing Certain Forms of Psychiatric
Treatment, 20 Soc. SCI. MED. 645, 646 (1985); Note, supra note 125, at 1661.
129. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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ian for a comatose adult existing in a chronic vegetative state and
recognized the parent's ability to discontinue life-sustaining treat-
ment for the patient. The court relied on Roe v. Wade to support a
constitutional right of privacy extending to personal health deci-
sions, including the decision to discontinue life-support systems.
The court reasoned that in Roe, the Constitution was read to "in-
terdict judicial intrusion into many aspects of personal deci-
sion."' 30 In Quinlan, the right of privacy was found to be "broad
enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances, in much the same way as
it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate
pregnancy under certain conditions."' 13 1 Even though the patient
in Quinlan was "grossly incompetent,"' 132 the court found that the
Constitution protected her "independent right of choice,"' 33
which during her incompetency, her father as guardian could ex-
ercise on her behalf.
Quinlan has been widely followed in cases recognizing a con-
stitutional right to refuse treatment, including life-sustaining
treatment, on the part of both competent and incompetent pa-
tients. 134 Citing a number of these state court decisions that up-
130. Id. at 663.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 664. The patient, Karen Quinlan, was in an unresponsive coma-
tose condition with no cognitive function. Id.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); Donaldson
v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Ct. App. 1992); Bouvia v. Superior Court,
225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d
713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 421
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Pearlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Guardi-
anship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Guardianship of Roe,
III, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980);
Superintendent of Belchertown Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977);
In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617
(Nev. 1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quackenbush, 383
A.2d 785 (Morris County Ct. 1978); Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 426 N.E.2d
809 (Ohio 1980); Guardianship of Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363 (Wash. 1984); In re
Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983), modified by In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372
(Wash. 1984); see also AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDI-
CIAL AFFAIRS, WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING LIFE PROLONGING MEDICAL
TREATMENT (1986); DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra
note 128, at 5 (1983); AMERICAN Hosp. ASS'N, POLICY AND STATEMENT OF PA-
TIENT'S CHOICES OF TREATMENT OPrIONS (1985); George J. Annas & Joan E.
Densberger, Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment: Autonomy vs. Paternalism, 15 To-
LEDO L. REV. 561 (1984); Robert M. Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the
Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 1 (1975); Norman L. Cantor, A Patients
Decision to Discontinue Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity vs. the Preser-
vation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973); Alexander M. Capron, Informed
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held the right of the individual to make personal medical
decisions, the Supreme Court, in a 1990 decision, Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health,'3 5 expressed its "assumption"
that "a competent person has a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause in refusing medical treatment."' 3 6 The Cruzan
Court recognized that this liberty interest could be exercised by
surrogate decisionmakers, acting on the patient's behalf during a
period of incompetency, and could be invoked even to discon-
tinue life-sustaining procedures or nutrition, as long as the indi-
vidual, while competent, clearly expressed a wish that this be
done. 3 7 In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor noted that
"our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of
physical freedom and self-determination."
3 8
f. Defining the Limits of Substantive Due Process Protection
for Autonomous Decisionmaking
In a number of areas, therefore, by invoking either the rubric
of "privacy" or the concept of "liberty," the Supreme Court has
recognized that due process protects a zone of autonomous deci-
sionmaking in matters that are personal and intimate and of ex-
treme importance to the individual-those matters dealing with
marriage, procreation, contraception, abortion, family relation-
ships, child rearing and education, occupation, residence, travel,
and health. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in a
broad defense of the autonomy principle in a right to die case,
noted that the constitutional right to privacy "is an expression of
Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340
(1975); T.A. Tucker Ronzetti, Constituting Family and Death Through the Struggle
with State Power: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 46 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 149 (1991); Martha Swartz, The Patient Who Refuses Medical Treatment: Di-
lemma for Hospitals and Physicians, 11 AM.J. L. & MED. 147 (1985); Note, supra note
125, at 1661.
135. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In Cruzan, the Court determined that it was con-
stitutionally permissible for a state to require "clear and convincing evidence" of
a patient's desires before terminating life-sustaining medical treatment. Id. at
283. The Missouri Supreme Court had rejected the request of parents of a co-
matose accident victim to withdraw artificial feeding and hydration because
"there was no clear and convincing evidence of [the patient's] desire to have life-
sustaining treatment withdrawn under such circumstances." Id. at 263. The
United States Supreme Court determined that the Missouri Supreme Court's"clear and convincing evidence" requirement furthered the state's interest in
preservation of human life" and did not violate the patient's due process rights.
Id. at 281.
136. Id. at 278-79.
137. See id. at 282.
138. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as
fundamental constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived
is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the fail-
ure to allow a competent human being the right of choice."'
139
How far does the sphere of personal autonomy extend?
Clearly it cannot cover all individual choices, or for that matter,
all choices regarded as important by the individual. Otherwise,
given the burden on government of satisfying the rigorous strict
scrutiny standard, a wide variety of governmental regulations
would be invalid, and the role of the legislature in accommodat-
ing private interests and seeking to further the public health,
safety, and welfare would be seriously compromised. Under con-
stitutional theory, only "fundamental" constitutional rights are
entitled to the protection of strict judicial scrutiny. Only those
liberties so deeply rooted in our history and tradition that they
are deemed to require special safeguarding by the judiciary
against intrusion by the political branches of government will be
given this extraordinary measure of constitutional protection.
Otherwise, the Supreme Court, the members of which are insu-
lated from political pressures by life tenure, 40 would usurp the
essential role of the legislature in a democracy.' 4' This role envi-
sions that the legislature, as the representatives of the people,
should shape social and economic policy for the society. Strict
judicial scrutiny of the actions of the political branches of govern-
ment must accordingly be reserved for special situations, such as
the protection of minority rights against majoritarian influences
and those fundamental liberties that the Constitution insulates
from interference from the political process. 142
But which liberties are deemed "fundamental"? In holding
139. Superintendent of Belchertown Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
(Mass. 1977) (holding that sixty-seven year old patient with mental retardation
retains right to refuse chemotherapy).
140. U.S. CONST. art. III.
141. The Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut, while greatly expanding the scope
of substantive due process to encompass a new area of constitutional privacy,
was careful to make clear that it could not play a role as "super-legislature to
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic
problems, business affairs, or social conditions." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 471, 482 (1965). For further discussion of Griswold, see supra notes 80-86
and accompanying text.
142. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that legislation should be closely scruti-
nized when such legislation facially conflicts with an express constitutional pro-
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that a prohibition on distributing contraceptives to minors vio-
lated the constitutional right of privacy, the Supreme Court in Ca-
rey v. Population Services International noted: "While the outer limits
of [the right of personal privacy] have not been marked by the
Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may
make without unjustified government interference are personal
decisions 'relating to marriage .... procreation, and child rearing
and education . . . .' "143
What do these categories have in common? What is it about
decisionmaking in these areas-marriage, procreation, child rear-
ing and education, as well as occupation, residence, travel, and
health-that justifies the special protection of strict constitutional
scrutiny? Some commentators have criticized the Court for offer-
ing "little assistance to one's understanding of what it is that
makes all this a unit." 144 Justice Stevens has attempted to identify
the elements common to the members of this series, noting that
they all deal with "the individual's right to make certain unusually
important decisions that will affect his own, or his family's
destiny. The Court has referred to such decisions as implicating
'basic values,' as being 'fundamental,' and as being dignified by
history and tradition."' 45 These areas are all "personal and inti-
mate," 146 having "serious and personal consequences of major
importance."1 4
7
But apparently not all intimate decisions that are central to
an individual's life will qualify. In a closely divided and contro-
versial decision, the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick rejected
the contention that the "personal and intimate" choice of sexual
activity, at least when that choice is homosexual, is protected by
constitutional privacy.' 48 In permitting the states to proscribe
143. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (citations
omitted); accord Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385 (1978); Smith v. Organi-
zation of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977);
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Kelley v.Johnson, 425
U.S. 238, 244 (1976).
144. John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Forward: On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 11 n.40 (1978); see also Jed Rubenfeld,
The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 749 (1989).
145. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 781 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter
Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916
(1976)).
146. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
147. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
148. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). In Bowers, Hardwick
challenged a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy. Id. at 188. Hardwick
had been convicted of violating the statute by committing sodomy in the bed-
19921 1739
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consensual homosexual activity, the Court characterized those
fundamental rights protected by constitutional privacy as "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."1 49 If the right in question fails to
meet this standard, it will not qualify as a "fundamental" right,
and government intrusion on the asserted right will not receive
heightened scrutiny. The right in question may be a liberty inter-
est within the meaning of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, but if it is not deemed "fundamen-
tal," the substantive protection afforded by those clauses will be
limited.
Nonfundamental liberties will be constitutionally protected,
but governmental intrusions on those liberties will be subjected
only to minimal judicial scrutiny. The Court will review govern-
mental action in such cases under the rational basis test, a flexible
balancing test that is deferential to the role of the legislature in
defining the public interest. 150 Only in rare instances will the
Court invalidate legislative action when it is applying the rational
basis test. The legislature or its delegate may not ignore
nonfundamental liberty interests altogether, but as long as gov-
ernmental action bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate state
interest, the majoritarian process may trump the individual's free-
dom to make choices in nonfundamental areas of liberty.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bowers, which placed the
freedom to engage in consensual homosexual conduct in this lat-
ter category of minimal scrutiny, diminishes the autonomy princi-
ple. Matters of sexuality, provided such conduct is not performed
room of his home. Id. The Court characterized Hardwick's constitutional chal-
lenge as an attempt to establish "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy." Id. at 191. The Court refused to recognize such a right and also de-
clined to immunize "homosexual conduct [that] occurs in the privacy of the
home" from the reach of state regulatory power. Id. at 191-95.
149. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled
by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
150. See id. at 186 (applying rational basis review to determine constitution-
ality of statute prohibiting sodomy); Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-48
(1976) (applying rational basis review to determine constitutionality of police
department policy regulating officers' hair length); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (applying rational basis review to determine consti-
tutionality of ordinance that prohibited certain unrelated persons from residing
together); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (ap-
plying rational basis review to evaluate constitutionality of statute regulating in-
terstate commerce in certain milk products); see also Thornburgh, 478 U.S. at 197
(White, J., dissenting) (arguing that freedom to choose to have abortion,
although liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, is not "funda-
mental" interest and therefore should receive only minimal scrutiny).
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publicly, are intimate and personal and are critical aspects of self-
definition and self-expression.' 5' As long as the other person in-
volved is a freely consenting adult, decisions about sexuality
should be left to the individual. The Court's decision in Bowers
undoubtedly reflected the perception of a general public condem-
nation of homosexuality as immoral. The Court did not decide
whether consensual heterosexual conduct is within the zone of
constitutional privacy, although several of the Justices suggested
that it is within the protected zone. 152 As long as consenting
adults are involved, what goes on in the privacy of the bedroom
should be beyond governmental control.153
Like the abortion controversy, the controversy concerning
homosexuality raises essentially moral and religious questions.
The Constitution should be read to place such essentially moral
and religious matters beyond governmental control. Although
religious doctrine or conventional morality may condemn certain
sexual practices, these matters, when engaged in privately be-
tween consenting adults, should be left to the individual. In our
system, government may not impose orthodoxy in matters of reli-
gion and morality.154 Although the government's legitimate in-
terest in protecting public health may justify some regulation of
sexual practices-for example, to prevent the spread of sexually
transmitted diseases-a total ban on certain sexual practices can-
not be justified based only on such health concerns. Those indi-
151. In a recent dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justice Scalia recog-
nized that autonomy over homosexual practices was difficult to distinguish from
autonomy over the abortion decision. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2873 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Specifically, Justice Scalia reasoned that homosexual sodomy is an "inti-
mate" and a "deep[ly] personal" decision involving "personal autonomy and
bodily integrity," as is the abortion decision. Id. at 2876 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia, of course, would find
that the Constitution protects neither decision.
152. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 215-16 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
153. Cf Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding statute prohibit-
ing contraception to be per se violation of fundamental rights); Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that statute criminalizing private possession of
obscenity in one's home violated First Amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut,
365 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that ban on sale of contraceptives violates funda-
mental rights).
154. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1944);
see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2839 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]n order to be legitimate, the
State's interest must be secular."). For further discussion of Barnette, see infra
notes 159 & 161 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Casey, see
supra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
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viduals who may be harmed by these practices are primarily the
sexual partners themselves, and as long as they are competent,
consenting adults, protecting them from harm would appear to
be an insufficient justification for banning such practices alto-
gether. Moreover, the state should not be permitted to ban pri-
vate sexual conduct in order to accomplish such objectives as
protection of the morals of children, promotion of family values,
or prevention of offenses to public sensibilities. Although a ma-
jority of our population may condemn homosexuality as immoral
and contrary to religious doctrine, a significant minority reject
such conceptions of morality and religion and prefer to engage in
sexual practices that the majority may consider deviant. We are a
pluralistic society that traditionally has celebrated our diversity.
The majority, quite simply, should not be permitted to legislate
morality or religion for a minority. Bowers is thus fundamentally
inconsistent with our constitutional values and should be
overruled. 
55
155. In addition to the areas of autonomy discussed above, matters of indi-
vidual appearance and lifestyle choices should also be considered within the area
of constitutional protection. In Kelly v. Johnson, the Court rejected a police of-
ficer's challenge to a police department policy that regulated officers' hair
length. Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). Specifically, the Court upheld
the regulation's constitutionality on the ground that it was reasonably related to
the need to insure uniformity of appearance and foster the esprit de corps of the
police force. Id. at 248. However, when government is not the employer, the
question of how an individual dresses and other matters of personal appearance
should be left to the individual.
Our history has reflected a great variety of hair and dress styles. Except in
special contexts in which government has traditionally exercised control over
these matters-such as in the military, in the prisons, in at least certain kinds of
governmental employment and perhaps in the public school-these matters
should be reserved for individual choice. How we wish to project our personal
appearance is intimately involved with the development and expression of indi-
vidual personality. It simply is inconsistent with our constitutional heritage for
government to dictate what shall be orthodox in matters of dress and hair style.
Similarly, what we eat and how we enjoy ourselves recreationally are matters
of individual choice. Government may regulate the production and sale of food
in order to protect the public health, but whether an individual chooses to eat
meat or to be a vegetarian is for the individual to decide. Although government
may educate its citizens about the health risks of eating certain foods, for exam-
ple, by warning them that fried foods are fattening and high in cholesterol,
whether people decide to eat such foods or not is a matter of individual taste.
Similarly, the government may educate its citizens about the dangers of
smoking and alcohol and regulate an individual's right to perform such activities
in public in order to protect the health and safety of others. However, whether
to smoke or to drink is a matter of individual choice, at least for an adult.
For the same reasons, government may regulate hazardous recreational ac-
tivities, but the decision whether to take up skydiving or skiing is left to the
individual. Individual autonomy over these matters of personal appearance,
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Between government and the individual, substantive due
process carves out an area in which the individual is left substan-
tially free to control important aspects of his or her own life. In a
political system committed to individual liberty and to facilitating
the pursuit of happiness, self-determination in important life
choices is respected and presumptively protected against govern-
mental intrusion. Any governmental interference with individual
liberty must be justified. At a minimum, it may not be arbitrary
and unreasonable. For infringement on fundamental liberties
long honored by our history and tradition, the burden ofjustifica-
tion must be high. This substantive protection of liberty has be-
come an accepted part of the meaning and promise of "due
process of law."
2. First Amendment Protection of Autonomy
The First Amendment provides an important measure of
constitutional protection for autonomous decisionmaking in mat-
ters of thought, belief, religion, expression, access to information,
participation in the political process, and association. Not only
are these freedoms safeguarded by the First Amendment, but the
freedoms the First Amendment protects are essential to the exer-
cise of all freedoms. As Justice Cardozo put it, freedom of speech
and thought are "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom."' 56 In his nonjudicial writ-
ings, Justice Cardozo reiterated this theme:
We are free only if we know, and so in proportion to our
knowledge. There is no freedom without choice, and
there is no choice without knowledge, or none that is not
illusionary. Implicit, therefore, in the very notion of lib-
erty is the liberty of the mind to absorb and to beget....
At the root of all liberty is the liberty to know.
157
The notion that freedom of speech and thought is a neces-
sary condition for all liberty is also expressed injustice Brandeis'
celebrated concurring opinion in Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the state was to make men free to develop their
faculties .... They valued liberty both as an end and as
156. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937), overruled by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
157. Benjamin Cardozo, The Paradox of Legal Science, in SELECTED WRITINGS
OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 317-18 (Margaret Hall ed., 1947).
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a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happi-
ness .... They believed that freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth .... 158
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has protected the in-
dividual's freedom of thought and belief by invalidating laws that
were designed to invade "the sphere of intellect and spirit which
it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from official control." 159 Government may, of course, at-
tempt to educate or influence its citizens concerning a variety of
matters,' 60 but decisionmaking must ultimately be left to the indi-
vidual. In our society, "no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein."' 6' As the Court has noted, "at the heart of the
First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free
to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should
158. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
159. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1944)
(holding that public school students may not be compelled to salute flag); accord
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding that newly-appointed public de-
fender could not discharge assistant public defenders solely because of political
beliefs); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (holding that non-
union employees need not pay service charge equivalent to amount of union
members' dues, a portion of which would be spent on political activities with
which nonunion employees disagreed); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715
(1977) (holding that Jehovah's Witness may not be compelled to display state
motto-"Live Free or Die"-on license plate); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347
(1976) (holding that employers cannot discharge employees on basis of employ-
ees' political party affiliations); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding
that statute prohibiting mere private possession of obscene material is unconsti-
tutional); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (holding that school may not prohibit students from quietly and passively
displaying armbands to protest Vietnam War); see also Winick, The Right to Refuse,
supra note 1, at 19-29 (1989) (discussing freedom to believe and freedom of
thought).
160. See, e.g., Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1312-14 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (dis-
cussing government speech designed to influence decisionmaking); see also Jo-
SEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND (1977); MARC G. YUDOFF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT ExPRESSION IN AMERICA
(1983); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1, 27-30; Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980);
Edward H. Ziegler, Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Parti-
sanship, 21 B.C. L. REV. 578 (1980).
161. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (invalidating statute requiring students to sa-
lute flag); see also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (invalidating
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be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by
the State." 1
62
The First Amendment therefore provides an important mea-
sure of constitutional protection for individual autonomy. By
protecting the "free exercise" of religion and prohibiting an "es-
tablishment of religion,"' 163 the First Amendment safeguards the
rights of individuals to choose their own religion or no religion at
all. 164 The amendment "forestalls compulsion by law" in matters
of religion and protects "[flreedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the
individual may choose."' 165
The First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech al-
lows the individual rather than the government to control the
content and form of his or her communication to others. Even
ideas deemed "offensive,"1 66 "loathsome,"1 67 "noxious," 68 or
"immoral"' 69 are protected by the First Amendment. The First
Amendment "is designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints on public discussion, putting the decision as to what
162. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35; see also Burns, 427 U.S. at 372.
163. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
164. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that Jeho-
vah's Witness may not be compelled to display state motto on license plate);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (application of compulsory school at-
tendance law to Amish parents who refused to send children to public school
after eighth grade in order to educate children at home violated First Amend-
ment's protection of free exercise of religion); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 488 (invalidat-
ing state requirement that public officials declare belief in God as condition for
holding public office); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624 (holding that students cannot be
compelled to salute flag); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding
that statute prohibiting distribution of religious material violated First
Amendment).
165. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
166. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989) (holding that First
Amendment protects individuals' right to burn United States flag as means of
protest). Congress responded to the Court's holding in Johnson by drafting The
Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 11 1990). The Flag Protec-
tion Act makes it a criminal offense to desecrate the United States flag. See id.
167. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the ex-
pression of opinions that we loathe ...."); Collins v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (holding that First Amendment protects
Nazi Party's ideas).
168. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) (upholding statute prohibiting formation of society for teaching
syndicalism).
169. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 n.8 (1969) (First and Fourteenth
Amendments preclude states from criminalizing mere possession of obscene
material in home).
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views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us."' 170
These matters are left to the individual "in the belief that no
other approach would comport with the premise of individual
dignity and choice upon which our political system rests."' 7'
Not only does the First Amendment protect choice in what an
individual may express, but it also allows the individual to choose
what information and ideas he or she may wish to receive. 72
Moreover, the First Amendment protects the individual's choice
of persons or groups with whom to associate for the purpose of
engaging in those activities protected by the amendment-
speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the
exercise of religion. 173 The First Amendment freedom of associa-
170. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
171. Id.
172. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 7
(1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that company cannot be compelled to in-
clude messages with which company disagrees in its billing statements); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603-04 (1982) (holding that
public and press have constitutionally protected right of access to criminal tri-
als); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion) (con-
cluding that First Amendment limits school board's ability to remove books
from school libraries); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
577-78 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that right of public and press to at-
tend criminal trials is guaranteed under First and Fourteenth Amendments); Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S.
748, 756-57 (1976) (holding that advertisement of prescription drug prices is
within protection of First and Fourteenth Amendments); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974) (holding that party corresponding with prisoner de-
rives protection from First and Fourteenth Amendments against unjustified gov-
ernmental interference with intended communication), overruled by Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63
(1972) (noting that Constitution protects right to receive information and ideas);
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (same); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308
(1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (asserting that right to receive publications is
fundamental personal right protected by Bill of Rights); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (holding that rights of freedom of speech and
freedom of press include right to distribute and right to receive information);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (holding that rights of
freedom of speech and freedom of press embrace right to distribute literature
and right to receive it); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (holding
that dissemination of information concerning facts of labor dispute is within area
of free discussion guaranteed by Constitution). See generally Thomas I. Emerson,
Legal Protection of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q 1.
173. Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); NAACP v.
Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (concluding that First Amend-
ment freedom of association protects blacks' right to engage in nonviolent boy-
cott of white merchants); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290 (1981) (holding that ordinance limiting contributions to $250 contra-
venes freedom of association guaranteed by First Amendment); Abood v. De-
troit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) (holding that nonunion employees
could not be compelled to pay service charge equivalent to that paid by union
members as dues when portion of service charge would be spent on political
42
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tion protects not only the right of an individual to associate with
others in an organization of the individual's choice and the right
to contribute to that organization, 174 but also the right not to be
compelled by the government to join an organization175 and the
right not to financially support an organization's efforts to ad-
vance an ideological cause with which the individual disagrees.' 76
Similarly, the First Amendment protects not only the right of the
individual to speak freely, but also "the right to refrain from
speaking at all."1
77
The First Amendment is therefore an important safeguard
for individual self-determination. In significant areas of the indi-
vidual's life-religion, morality, politics, and aesthetics-the First
Amendment leaves decisionmaking to the individual, free from
governmental intrusion. In addition, these First Amendment
freedoms, and the Amendment's protection of access to informa-
tion and ideas, facilitate the exercise of self-determination in all
areas of the individual's life.
3. Fifth and Sixth Amendment Protection for Autonomous
Decisionmaking in the Criminal Process
When an individual is accused of a crime, the Constitution
protects the individual's right to determine the course of his or
her defense and the strategy he or she may wish to employ. The
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments re-
activities with which employees disagreed); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-57
(1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that public employees may not be discharged
for refusal to join Democratic Party); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487
(1975) (upholding individuals' right to choose political party); Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972) (holding that First Amendment precludes college from
refusing to recognize student association merely because college disagrees with
organization's philosophy); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 n.7
(1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (group legal practice); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 240
(1959). See generally TRIBE, supra note 22, § 12-23, at 977-86.
174. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
479 U.S. 238 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
175. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363-64 n.17 (1976).
176. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235 (holding that public school teachers could not
be required, as condition of employment, to contribute union dues when dues
were to be used to further ideological causes that were not germane to collective
bargaining).
177. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that state
could not require motor vehicle to bear license plates embossed with state
motto-"Live Free or Die"-over objection ofJehovah's Witnesses who viewed
motto as repugnant to moral, religious, and political beliefs); see also West Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943) (holding that public
school students could not be required to participate in compulsory flag salute).
19921
43
Winick: On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
quire a range of procedural protections that are designed not
only to achieve accuracy of adjudication, but also to promote and
protect the defendant's participatory and dignitary interests. 178
Our long tradition of procedural fairness honors the dignity of
the individual defendant by allowing him or her to play a major
role in determining how to face criminal charges. These concepts
of fairness are animated by a vision of the autonomous and ra-
tional defendant who, together with chosen counsel, is en-
couraged to and is able to mount a defense with the full vigor that
the adversary system contemplates.
The Fifth Amendment, both through its general due process
commitment and its specific protection against compulsory self-
incrimination, stands as an endorsement of the adversary system
and as a rejection of the inquisitorial mode of adjudication used
in countries following the civil law tradition and employed in the
despised Star Chamber proceedings. The adversary system is
premised on the autonomy of the litigants. The litigants shape
the issues, marshall and adduce the evidence, and select their own
strategies for presenting the case. In an inquisitorial system, the
judge plays an active role in discovering the facts. By contrast, in
the adversary system, the judge plays an essentially passive role.
Injury trials the judge merely presides over the trial in a neutral
and independent fashion, or, in cases in which a jury trial has
been waived or is unavailable, the judge acts as a neutral fact
finder, and the active control of the case is left to the adverse
parties. 1
79
In furtherance of the adversary system, various constitutional
protections allow the defendant to shape his or her defense and
exercise a substantial degree of control over many aspects of the
trial process. A criminal defendant may choose to plead guilty or
not guilty, to represent himself or herself or to retain counsel, to
challenge jurors for cause or to remove jurors by peremptory
178. See, e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174, 176-77 (1984) (right
to self-representation). For a discussion of the purposes behind the procedural
safeguards embodied in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, see generally
Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to
Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 765, 799-806 (1989).
179. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) ("The very premise
of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be con-
victed and the innocent go free."). See generally GEOFFREY HAZZARD, THE ADVER-
SARY SYSTEM (1978); STEPHEN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE:
THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION (1988).
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challenge, to make pretrial motions, to raise particular defenses,
to demand a jury trial or a bench trial, to call witnesses on his or
her behalf, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, to testify, to
move for a mistrial when error has occurred, or to appeal if
convicted.'8 0
The state's ability to intrude on these decisions or on the
ability of the defendant to confer with counsel concerning them
has been limited by the Supreme Court in several important re-
spects. For example, the state may not, through forcible adminis-
tration of antipsychotic medication to a defendant, interfere with
the ability to make these decisions by diminishing the interaction
with counsel or the capacity to comprehend the proceedings.' 8 '
When the defendant chooses to invoke his or her Fifth Amend-
ment right not to testify, the prosecution may not penalize this
choice by asking the jury to draw an inference from the assertion
of the privilege.' 82 The state may not interfere with the defend-
ant's presentation of a defense by requiring him or her to testify
first or not at all.' 8 3 When the defendant chooses to testify, the
state may not diminish the ability to present a defense by prohib-
iting testimony that is recalled or refreshed through hypnosis. 8 4
The state may not unreasonably interfere with the attorney-client
relationship, which is essential to the defendant's ability to guide
his or her defense, by rules that unreasonably ban attorney-client
communications during trial.' 85 In addition, the prosecution may
not discourage a defendant from exercising the right to appeal by
threatening to subject him or her to more serious charges on re-
trial if the appeal is successful.' 8 6
Although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments allow the criminal
180. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1817 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that rights "essential" to a fair trial include "the right to
effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-
examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain
silent without penalty for doing so").
181. See id. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[A] defendant's right to the
effective assistance of counsel is impaired [when the state's action compromises
his ability to] cooperate in an active manner with his lawyer."); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1972).
182. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965).
183. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972).
184. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) ("Just as a state may not
apply an arbitrary rule of competence to exclude a material defense witness from
taking the stand, it also may not apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness
to take the stand, but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testimony.").
185. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1975).
186. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969), modified by Ala-
bama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
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defendant to exercise a significant degree of control over whether
and how he or she will present a defense, the defendant may
choose to waive these Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Waiver
usually requires a "voluntary relinquishment of a known right or
privilege."'' 8 7 There are some rights, however, that may be
waived by action or inaction of the defendant's attorney, and
these rights may sometimes be waived without an informed deci-
sion by the defendant.' 8 8 Thus, defense counsel's failure to raise
a timely objection to the admissibility of a confession is deemed
sufficient to waive the issue, whether or not the defendant con-
sents.189 Similarly, the failure of defense counsel to challenge the
composition of the grand or petit jury can constitute waiver with-
out the defendant participating in the decision. 190 Counsel's fail-
ure to cross-examine a witness or to raise and preserve a point
may also act as a waiver of important constitutional rights.' 9 1
Although counsel may occasionally waive the client's rights
without consultation, the defendant has the opportunity, at least
in theory, to control the actions of counsel. The waiver-by-coun-
sel rule is based, at least in part, on the assumption that a defend-
ant will object if counsel seeks to waive rights that the defendant
187. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1981) (waiver of
right to counsel); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (same); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (standard of waiver in plea bargaining);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (right to counsel during custodial
interrogation); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver of right to
counsel).
188. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 n.14 (1977) (holding
that defendant's counsel waived ability to challenge confession .by failing to
timely object); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976) (holding that Due
Process Clause was not violated when defendant wore prison attire to trial and
when defendant's counsel failed to object); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820 ("[C]ounsel
[may have] power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas.");
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 450-52 (1965) (concluding that absent ex-
ceptional circumstances, counsel's decisions are not subject to judicial review
even if such decisions were made without consulting client); United States ex rel.
Brown v. Warden, 417 F. Supp. 970, 972-73 (N.D. I1. 1976) (collecting cases);
see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.6, at
57-58 (1984) (collecting cases that set forth decisions that are within "ultimate
authority" of counsel).
189. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); see also Heiny, 379 U.S. at 443
(failure to object to illegal search); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3), 12(0.
190. Frances v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Davis v. United States,
411 U.S. 233 (1973); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Michael v. Lou-
isiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955); Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973) (en
banc); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a) (1968); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2), 12(0.
191. Michael E. Tigar, Forward. Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-60 (1970); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 188,
§ 11.6, at 58.
1750 [Vol. 37: p. 1705
46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 6 [1992], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss6/5
PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY
wishes to assert. 192 Moreover, there are limits to the waiver-by-
counsel rule. The Supreme Court has stated that "the accused
has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions
regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury,
testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal."'
93
The defendant's ability to exercise control, even over deci-
sions that his or her attorney may make without consultation, is
also protected by the defendant's right to select counsel of choice,
as well as by the right to waive counsel altogether and choose self-
representation. The Supreme Court has consistently construed
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right of the accused "to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense"' 94 as protecting
the defendant's right to select his or her own counsel.
95
Although the Sixth Amendment is now construed also to guaran-
tee the right of an indigent defendant to the appointment of
counsel, 196 courts have always interpreted the Sixth Amendment
to protect "the right of an accused to 'a fair opportunity to secure
counsel of his own choice.' ,197
192. See Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1944) (asserting that
when defendant fails to object to actions taken by counsel, assumption is that
defendant "consented to or ratified" those actions), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869
(1945).
193. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (dicta); see also Riggins v.
Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1820 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It is the ac-
cused, not counsel, who must be 'informed of the nature and cause of the accu-
sation,' who must be 'confronted with the witnesses against him,' and who must
be accorded 'compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' ") (quot-
ing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987)); Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 93 n.1
(Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Only such basic decisions as whether to plead
guilty, waive a jury, or testify in one's own behalf are ultimately for the accused
to make."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.2, at 21-22 (2d ed.
1980) ("[T]he power of decision in matters of trial strategy and tactics rests with
the lawyer."); 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 188, § 11.6, at 53-62 (collecting
Supreme Court cases requiring personal decisions of defendants).
194. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
195. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 661 (1948). For a discussion of the his-
torical origins of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, see Winick,
supra note 178, at 786-99.
196. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1962) (recognizing that indigent accused has right to ap-
pointed counsel).
197. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958) (quoting Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932)); see also Caplin & Drysdale v. United States,
491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) (recognizing defendant's right to retain counsel of
choice); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (recognizing "right to
select and be represented by one's preferred attorney," but approving court's
barring of representation by counsel found to have conflict of interest); Chan-
dler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1954) (reversing conviction in which defendant
was denied right to counsel of choice); Bute, 333 U.S. at 661 (recognizing right
of accused to counsel of choice in a federal proceeding); Glasser v. United
175119921
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In addition, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth
Amendment to guarantee the right of the defendant to dispense
with the representation of counsel and to represent himself. 198 In
upholding the right to self-representation in Faretta v. California,
the Supreme Court expressly invoked autonomy values, stating
that the courts should respect the decision of the individual who
"will bear the personal consequences of a conviction."'' 99 Even
though the decision of a legally untrained defendant who waives
counsel and chooses self-representation may be imprudent, the
Court honored the defendant's choice out of the "respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law." 20 0 "[T]hose who
wrote the Bill of Rights," noted the Court, "understood the ines-
timable worth of free choice." 2
0'
The Sixth Amendment rights to retain counsel of choice and
to waive counsel reflect "constitutional protection of the defend-
ant's free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness
of the proceeding. '" 20 2 Allowing the defendant free choice in the
critical matter of representation at trial fosters both the reliability
of the outcome and values unrelated to truth determination. The
right to counsel of choice is critical to "the basic trust between
counsel and client, which is a cornerstone of the adversary sys-
tem." 20 3 Like the right to self-representation, which exists in
large part to "affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused" by
affording him or her a strong measure of control over the pro-
ceedings, 20 4 the right to counsel of choice "is premised on re-
spect for the individual. '" 20 5 The Constitution affords defendants
a fundamental constitutional right to choose the type of defense
States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942) (recognizing right of defendant to counsel of
choice); Powell, 287 U.S. at 53 (same).
198. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984); Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (reversing criminal conviction in which defendant was re-
fused right to represent himself); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 269, 279 (1942) (recognizing that Constitution does not force criminal de-
fendant to accept attorney).
199. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 833-34.
202. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 267-68 (1984).
203. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1162 (1982); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324 n.17 (1981)
(stressing need for confidence in attorney-client relationship); ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-3.1 (2d ed. 1980) (same).
204. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174, 176-77 (1984).
205. Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 286 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Faretta,
422 U.S. at 834 (noting defendant's choice concerning whether to be repre-
sented by counsel must be honored out of respect for individual).
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they wish to present.20 6 This right, also supported by autonomy
values, is intimately connected with the right to select counsel of
choice, because "the most important decision a defendant makes
in shaping his defense is his selection of an attorney." 20 7 These
constitutional safeguards applicable in criminal cases thus further
reflect the high value the Constitution places on individual
autonomy.
B. Protection for Autonomy in Other Areas of the Law
The principle of autonomy also permeates much of American
law outside the domain of the Constitution. Autonomy influences
not only public law, but private law as well. 20 8 For example, a
strong commitment to individual autonomy is reflected in the his-
tory and development of the law of contracts. "As freedom be-
came a rallying cry for political reforms, freedom of contract was
the ideological principle for development of the law of con-
tract." 20 9 The insistence of utilitarian theorists Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill on "freedom of bargaining" as indispensable
to progress had an indelible influence on the development of con-
tract law.21 0 The principle of freedom of contract is rooted in the
utilitarian premise that "it is in the public interest to recognize
that individuals have broad powers to order their own affairs by
making legally enforceable promises." 21' The foundation of con-
tract law is built on this notion of private autonomy. This notion
has been expressed as "recognizing the desirability of allowing
individuals to regulate, to a large extent, their own affairs, the
State has conferred upon them the power to bind themselves by
expression of their intention to be bound." 212
Contract law is thus premised on the ability of individuals to
206. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (noting that Constitu-
tion affords defendants right to present best defense); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (holding that right to present defense is fundamental to due
process of law); Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emerging
Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713, 793-95 (1976) (ana-
lyzing constitutional basis of right to present defense and deriving such right
from general reading of Bill of Rights).
207. United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979).
208. See, e.g., HAROLD C. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT
30-31 (1961) (noting influence of individual freedom on contract law).
209. JOHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-
3, at 5-6 (3d ed. 1987).
210. Id.
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 2-3 (1981) (introductory note
to Chapter 8).
212. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 209, § 1-4, at 8.
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order their own affairs and the desirability of allowing them to do
so. In our market economy, unlike in communist economic sys-
tems, economic decisionmaking, at least at the microeconomic
level, is left substantially to the individual. Indeed, the evident
failure of having state control over the means of production and
distribution was a principal cause of the recent collapse of com-
munism in Eastern Europe. In our society, the individual is sub-
stantially free to order his or her economic affairs as he or she
chooses.
The laws of property and of trusts and estates are also based
on individual autonomy. These areas of law are premised on the
notion that individuals may exercise substantial control over the
use and enjoyment of their property, and may determine what
shall be done with it during their lives and upon their deaths.
Although state law may provide general rules for the distribution
of the estates of those who die intestate, the individual is free to
fashion his or her own scheme of distribution by executing a will
directing in what manner the property shall be disposed or by
disposing of the property by gift or conveyance during the indi-
vidual's life.
Similarly, basic principles of tort and criminal law defer to
individual autonomy. Both criminal and tort law impose rules of
conduct designed for the protection of others, but neither con-
trols the individual's conduct; they merely constrain human be-
havior by imposing after-the-event consequences for rule
infractions. The consequences-civil damages or criminal pun-
ishment-are designed to deter the individual from engaging in
careless or antisocial behavior. This deterrence approach recog-
nizes and fosters individual autonomy by allowing people to
choose whether or not to obey the law. 21 3 In general, individuals
may violate the principles of tort law as long as they are willing to
compensate the victims of their carelessness, and they may even
choose to violate criminal prohibitions as long as they are willing
to pay the penalties. Although seriously constrained, a degree of
autonomous choice is left to the individual.
Individual autonomy is also basic to our systems of civil and
criminal procedure. 21 4 Both are based on the adversary system,
which provides the litigants with substantial autonomy in shaping
213. See Note, supra note 2, at 1232-33 (analyzing criminal law's deterrence
approach as premised on personal autonomy).
214. See ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE 1571-72 (1988) (concluding
that civil and criminal procedure are "premised upon litigant autonomy").
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the issues for adjudication, in adducing the evidence, and in fram-
ing the arguments.21 5 In addition, most criminal and civil dis-
putes are resolved through negotiation and settlement; the
individual is always free to accept a settlement or a guilty plea or
to litigate the matter.2
1 6
Although autonomy is an important value reflected in these
areas of the law, as with the various branches of constitutional
doctrine previously discussed, autonomy is not the only value.
The law may allow and indeed encourage individual choice in a
variety of areas. Such choice, however, is occasionally con-
strained by governmental regulation that advances a variety of so-
cial and economic goals. But this governmental regulation
operates against a backdrop of individual autonomy. The law
both assumes the desirability of individual decisionmaking and at-
tempts to facilitate it. Law in our society is a system of regulating
behavior, not of controlling it.
III. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE OF CHOICE
Apart from constitutional principles and political theory, the
justification for deference to individual autonomy can be
grounded in psychological theory. This section examines several
principles of cognitive and social psychology in an effort to con-
duct a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis of legal rules protecting
autonomy. As this analysis demonstrates, there is considerable
psychological value in allowing people to make choices for them-
selves. By contrast, governmental control, especially over deci-
sions that vitally affect the individual, may be psychologically
damaging to those denied the ability to be self-determining.
217
Individuals are far more able to chart a course for the pursuit
215. For a further discussion of individual autonomy in criminal procedure,
see supra notes 178-207 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 1I (setting forth procedure to assure volunta-
riness in plea bargains); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (re-
quiring as condition for entry of guilty plea that defendants voluntarily
relinquish known rights or privileges).
217. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Riggins v. Nevada, re-
cently recognized this principle in the criminal context. Riggins v. Nevada, 112
S. Ct. 1810, 1820 (1992). Riggins involved the forced administration, during
trial, of a high dose of antipsychotic medication to a defendant wishing to be
tried free of the effects of such medication. Forcible medication in this situation,
Justice Kennedy found, can " 'lead to the defendant's loss of self-determination
undermining the desire for self-preservation which is necessary to engage the
defendant in his own defense in preparation for his trial.' " Id. (quoting Brief
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of their own happiness than is the government. Individuals know
their own tastes and preferences and can better assess their abili-
ties and circumstances. An individual's choices from the menu of
life are inevitably bound to prove more self-satisfying and suitable
than any made by an impersonal bureaucrat or even an enlight-
ened philosopher king. Moreover, the individual's act of select-
ing goals and objectives will itself be an important ingredient in
the attainment of those goals.
People generally do not respond well when told what to do.
Unless they themselves see the merit in achieving a particular
goal, they often will not pursue it, or if required to do so, will
comply only half-heartedly. Indeed, sometimes even when the
costs of noncompliance are high, people may resent the pressure
imposed by others and refuse to comply. Sometimes they may
even act perversely in ways calculated to frustrate achievement of
the goal. By contrast, individuals appreciate having their auton-
omy respected and being allowed to exercise choice. Not only do
individuals prefer choice to compulsion, but "the law strongly fa-
vors allowing individual choice rather than attempting to achieve
public or private goals through compulsion. ' 21 8 In addition to
the moral and political values reflected in the law's preference,
it is strongly supported by considerations of therapeutic
jurisprudence.
Principles of cognitive and social psychology help to explain
why permitting individuals to exercise choice often enhances the
likelihood of success in attaining their goals.219 People directed
to perform tasks do not feel personally committed to the goal or
personally responsible for the goal's fulfillment. 220 This feeling
218. Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the Govern-
ment as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 765
& n.90 (1991); see also HAVIGHURST, supra note 208, at 30-31 (noting value law
places on individual choice in contract law). For a further discussion of the value
of individual choice, see supra notes 6-217 and accompanying text.
219. See SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE:
A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 301 (1981) (noting need for patient partic-
ipation in therapy and for resistance by patient when patient perceives therapy
as forced); WEXLER & WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 4, at 68-74, 107-14 (discussing cognitive and social psychology theories as
they apply to freedom of choice and informed consent); Winick, supra note 218,
at 752-72 (discussing cognitive and perceptual processes and role such
processes play in human learning); Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment,
supra note 1, at 46-53 (noting existence of increased treatment success rate when
individuals are given treatment choices); Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary
Hospitalization, supra note 1, at 192-99 (noting therapeutic value of allowing pa-
tients to voluntarily choose hospitalization).
220. ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A
1756 [Vol. 37: p. 1705
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may apply even for tasks the individual is directed to perform in
furtherance of his or her own best interests. Choice, on the other
hand, brings a degree of commitment that mobilizes the self-
evaluative and self-reinforcing mechanisms that facilitate goal
achievement. 22'
Patient response to medical treatment provides a useful ex-
ample. When physicians do not allow patient participation in
treatment decisions and do not explain treatment, patients often
fail to comply with medical advice. 222 When a patient elects to
engage in a course of treatment or to accept a treatment recom-
mended by the physician, psychological theory would predict a
higher likelihood of success than when the patient is simply told
what to do. To the extent that a patient's election or agreement
constitutes an affirmative expression of choice in favor of the
treatment recommended, this expression of choice itself may be
therapeutic. Compliance with a treatment plan is often indis-
pensable to successful treatment. Unless patients appear for
scheduled appointments or take their prescribed medication,
treatment cannot succeed. Patient choice may have a particularly
important role in the success of verbal treatment techniques
like psychotherapy223 or even of many forms of behavioral treat-
SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 338, 363, 368, 468-69, 470-71, 475-76, 478-79
(1986) (discussing goal-setting theory).
221. Id. at 338, 363, 368, 468, 478-80 (discussing relationship between
choice and goal achievement); BREHM & BREHM, supra note 219, at 301; DONALD
MEICHENBAUM & DENNIS C. TURK, FACILITATING TREATMENT ADHERENCE: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDEBOOK 20, 156-57 (1987) (noting benefits of choice in med-
ical treatment).
222. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 125, at 28 (noting that increased compli-
ance with treatments results from medical community communicating effectively
with patients); MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 221, at 76-79 (discussing ne-
cessity of change in medical community toward better communication with pa-
tient and participation in medical decisionmaking); see also Paul S. Appelbaum &
Thomas G. Gutheil, Drug Refusal: A Study of Psychiatric Inpatients, 137 AM. J. Psy-
CHIATRY 340, 341 (1980) (recognizing correlation between patient's adherence
to drug treatment and quality of doctor-patient relationship); Marjorie M.
Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J.
219, 293 & n.323 (1985) (observing that patients consulted about treatment per-
form better than patients not consulted).
223. See Council of the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Position Statement on the Ques-
tion of Adequacy of Treatment, 123 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1458, 1459 (1967) ("[I]t may
be said in general that the effectiveness of the psychotherapies is proportional to
the degree of cooperation that is present.");Jay Katz, The Right to Treatment-An
Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755, 777 (1969) (stressing need for
patient cooperation in psychotherapeutic treatment); Robert Michels, Ethical Is-
sues of Psychological and Psychotherapeutic Means of Behavior Control: Is the Moral Con-
tract Being Observed?, 3 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11, 11 (1973) (discussing limited
efficacy of psychotherapy imposed involuntarily); Clifford D. Stromberg & Alan
A. Stone, 4 Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON
19921 1757
53
Winick: On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ment,2 24 because these approaches are largely dependent for
their success on the conscious involvement and active coopera-
tion of the patient. But this relationship between personal choice
and treatment success may exist for a variety of medical treatment
techniques as well.
This positive relationship between individual choice and goal
achievement would seem applicable to the selection of a great va-
riety of goals outside the treatment context-for example, educa-
tional, occupational, economic, athletic, and familial goals.
Psychological theory shows that the setting of explicit goals is it-
self a significant factor in their accomplishment. 225 This "goal-
setting effect is one of the most robust findings in the psychologi-
cal literature.- 2 26 An individual's conscious setting of a goal is
virtually indispensable to its achievement. 227 The setting of a
goal at least implicitly involves a prediction by the individual that
the goal is achievable and a commitment that he or she will at-
LEGIS. 275, 328 (1983) (commenting on beneficial impact when patients partici-
pate in treatment); Winick, Right to Refuse, supra note 1, at 83 (1989) (recognizing
that success of psychotherapy depends on patient's willingness to participate).
224. See EDWARD ERWIN, BEHAVIOR THERAPY: SCIENTIFIC, PHILOSOPHICAL
AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS 180-81 (1978) (rejecting notion that behavioral tech-
niques can be used to mechanically control behavior because of necessity of pa-
tient involvement in behavioral therapy); MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 221,
at 150; Albert Bandura, Behavior Theory and the Models of Man, 29 AM. PSYCHOL.
859, 862 (1974) (rejecting mechanistic view of behavior therapy and suggesting
need for patient choice and cooperation for effective treatment); Isaac M. Marks,
The Current Status of Behavioral Psychotherapy: Theory and Practice, 133 AM. J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 253, 255 (1976) (noting need for patient cooperation in behavioral treat-
ment); Bruce J. Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65
MINN. L. REV. 331, 360-61 (1981) (recognizing that patient involvement and co-
operation in behavioral therapy is essential to successful treatment); Winick,
Right to Refuse, supra note 1, at 80 (noting importance of patient cooperation in
behavioral therapy).
225. Donald J. Campbell, The Effects of Goal-Contingent Payment on the Perform-
ance of a Complex Task, 37 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 23, 23 (1984) (noting higher
achievement rate for those who set specific goals); Vandra L. Huber, Comparison
of Monetary Reinforcers and Goal Setting as Learning Incentives, 56 PSYCHOL. REP. 223
(1985) (noting that goal setting and performance-contingent pay can stimulate
higher performance than noncontingent hourly pay); Daniel S. Kirschenbaum &
Randall C. Flanery, Toward a Psychology of Behavioral Contracting, 4 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. REV. 597, 603-09 (1984) (analyzing critical role goal setting plays in
psychotherapeutic tool of behavioral contracting); Edwin A. Locke et al., Goal
Setting and Task Performance: 1969-1980, 90 PSYCHOL. BULL. 125, 125-33 (1981)
(noting that goals that are more difficult to attain lead to better results than
goals that are of medium difficulty or are easy to attain); James R. Terborg &
Howard E. Miller, Motivation, Behavior, and Performance: A Closer Examination of Goal
Setting and Monetary Incentives, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 29, 30-31 (1978).
226. Campbell, supra note 225, at 23; Locke et al., supra note 225, at 145.
227. BANDURA, supra note 220, at 469 ("Those who set no goals achieve no
change ....").
1758 [Vol. 37: p. 1705
54
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 6 [1992], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss6/5
1992] PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY 1759
tempt to achieve it. This prediction and expression of commit-
ment in turn creates expectancies that help to bring about goal
achievement. 2
28
Thus, an individual's positive expectancies concerning treat-
ment success, educational achievement, occupational advance-
ment, economic improvement, and athletic performance play an
important role in restoring health and in achieving educational,
occupational, economic, and athletic goals. The medical treat-
ment context is again illustrative. A patient who expects to im-
prove because of treatment often improves; one who expects no
change often experiences none. Indeed, patients' positive expec-
tancies concerning treatment success are thought to explain the
therapeutic power of such phenomena as the placebo effect, the
Hawthorne effect and the medicine man.2 29 Although not yet
fully understood, these phenomena suggest the existence of a
powerful relationship between a patient's expectations of im-
provement and the patient's perceived and even actual improve-
ment. An increasing variety of medical and psychological
conditions are treated with hypnosis and positive imaging tech-
niques that ask patients to visualize their bodies fighting illness
and their ultimate restoration to health.230 The positive attitudes
and expectations thereby created allow patients to mobilize their
228. See id. at 412-13, 467 (discussing outcome expectancy theories); Edwin
L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic Motivational
Processes, 13 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 39, 59 (1980) (noting
that subjects of experiment who were given choices were more intrinsically moti-
vated than subjects who had choices externally imposed).
229. See, e.g., JOHN G. BOURKE, THE MEDICINE MEN OF THE APACHE 452
(197 1) (observing that ability to inspire belief in patients that he has "the gift" is
prerequisite to being "a diyi" or medicine man); HOWARD BRODY, PLACEBOS AND
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE: CLINICAL, CONCEPTUAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES 19
(1980) ("[T]he patient's expectation of symptom change is held to be causally
connected to the change that occurs."); MICHAELJOSPE, THE PLACEBO EFFECT IN
HEALING 93-108, 130 (1978) (analyzing Hawthorne effect in terms of expectancy
theory); 0. CARL SIMONTON ET AL., GETTING WELL AGAIN 22 (1978) (discussing
placebo effect in healing); Frederick J. Evans, Expectancy, Therapeutic Instructions,
and the Placebo Response, in PLACEBO: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND MECHANISMS 215,
222-24 (Leonard White et al. eds., 1985) (concluding that "placebo response is
mediated by expectancies generated within the context of the doctor-patient re-
lationship"); Jerome D. Frank, Biofeedback and the Placebo Effect, 7 BIOFEEDBACK &
SELF-REGULATION 449 (1982) (explaining placebo effect in terms of expectancy
theory); Peter Horvath, Placebos and Common Factors in Two Decades of Psychotherapy
Research, 104 PSYCHOL. BULL. 214, 215 (1988) ("Expectancy factors have been
shown to influence therapeutic outcome.").
230. See, e.g., Martin T. Orne & David F. Dinges, Hypnosis, in 2 COMPREHEN-
SIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY IV 1501, 1511-12 (Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin
J. Sadock eds., 5th ed. 1989) (discussing use of hypnosis and positive imaging to
cure physical ailments).
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psychic resources in ways that may play a critical role in the thera-
peutic process.23' Such expectancies and positive attitudes ap-
pear more active in patients, students, workers, athletes or others
when they voluntarily choose their own goals and the mechanisms
for achieving them than when goals are imposed over their
objection.
Principles of cognitive psychotherapy help to explain how
these positive attitudes and expectancies facilitate success and
why they are more likely to be engaged when the goal is freely
chosen. Predictions and expectations concerning the achieve-
ment of goals stimulate feelings of self-efficacy, which in turn
spark action and effort in furtherance of the goals.232 The volun-
tary setting of goals enhances motivation2 33 and increases the in-
dividual's effort through self-monitoring, self-evaluation and self-
reactive processes.23 4 Setting goals serves to structure and to
guide the individual's behavior over the often long course of con-
duct necessary to achieve the goals. 235 Goal-setting provides di-
rection for the individual and focuses his or her interest,
attention, and personal involvement on the effort. 23 6
An individual's choice of a goal also may trigger a form of
what Leon Festinger described as "cognitive dissonance." Cog-
nitive dissonance is the tendency of individuals to reinterpret in-
formation and experience that conflicts with their internally
231. See Rene Dubos, Introduction, in NORMAN COUSINS, ANATOMY OF AN ILL-
NESS AS PERCEIVED BY THE PATIENT: REFLECTIONS ON HEALING AND REGENERA-
TION 11, 18, 22-23 (1979) (recognizing ability of mind to "mobilize the natural
defense mechanisms of the patient"); KENNETH R. PELLETIER, MIND AS HEALER,
MIND AS SLAYER 40-41 (1977) (noting evolution of psychosomatic medicine and
its importance in healing process); SIMONTON ET AL., supra note 229, at 4-12 (dis-
cussing use of visual imagery in cancer healing process); Shultz, supra note 222,
at 292-93 (noting evidence that suggests that developing patients' psychic re-
sources is important in healing process).
232. See BANDURA, supra note 220, at 413, 470-71 (discussing relationship
between goal setting and self-efficacy); Horvath, supra note 229, at 218 ("The
belief that the treatment works in the manner outlined in the rationale motivates
the client to perform the tasks of the therapy.").
233. See Deci & Ryan, supra note 228, at 59 (defining intrinsically motivated
behaviors as those that are motivated by underlying need for competence and
self-determination and performed in absence of any apparent external contin-
gency);Julian B. Rotter, Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of
Reinforcement, 80 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 1, 1, 24-25 (1966) (behavior varies as
function of individual's generalized expectancies that outcomes are determined
by individual's own actions or by external sources beyond individual's control).
234. See BANDURA, supra note 220, at 469-72; MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra
note 221, at 158-61.
235. See BANDURA, supra note 220, at 469.
236. See id. at 471-72 (discussing interest enhancement that results from
goal setting).
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accepted or publicly stated beliefs in order to avoid the unpleas-
ant personal state that such inconsistencies produce. 237 Cogni-
tive dissonance affects not only perception, but behavior as well,
producing efforts in furtherance of the individual's stated goal in
order to avoid the dissonance that failure to achieve the goal
would create. 238 Cognitive dissonance can cause the individual to
mobilize energies and resources in order to accomplish the goal.
Because failure to achieve an externally imposed goal will not
produce similar feelings of dissonance, the motivating effects of
cognitive dissonance are more likely to occur when the individual
chooses the goal rather than having it imposed by others.
Motivation to succeed is an essential ingredient in goal
achievement. Ask any teacher. Ability to accomplish a goal,
although necessary, will not produce success by itself; unless indi-
viduals are motivated to succeed, they will not commit the effort
needed to bring about success. Psychologist Edward Deci's dis-
tinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 239 helps to ex-
plain why choice works better than compulsion. Intrinsic
motivation involves self-determining behavior and is associated
with "an internal perceived locus of causality, feelings of self-de-
termination, and a high degree of perceived competence or self-
esteem." 240 With extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, the
perceived locus of causality is external and feelings of compe-
tence and self-esteem are diminished. 24' When people are al-
lowed to be self-determining, they function more effectively, with
a higher degree of commitment and greater satisfaction.2 42
These feelings increase the motivation to succeed, stimulate posi-
tive expectations and attitudes, and spark effort. 2
43
237. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2-3, 18-24, 73
(1957) [hereinafter COGNITIVE DISSONANCE]; LEON FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECI-
SION, AND DISSONANCE 43 (1964). For a review of empirical studies on cognitive
dissonance, see JACK W. BREHM & ARTHUR R. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNI-
TIVE DISSONANCE 221-44 (1962).
238. FESTINGER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, supra note 237, at 19.
239. See EDWARD L. DECI, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION (1975) (reviewing studies
in intrinsic motivation and discussing development of its interplay with extrinsic
rewards and controls); EDWARD L. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINA-
TION (1980) [hereinafter THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION]; Deci &
Ryan, supra note 228, at 41-43, 60-63, 67.
240. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 239, at 41.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 208-10; see also CHARLES A. KIESLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COM-
MITMENT: EXPERIMENTS LINKING BEHAVIOR TO BELIEF 164-67 (1971) (finding
most effective method for behavior therapists to obtain desired results with pa-
tients was to give patients perception that they had freedom and control).
243. See BANDURA, supra note 220, at 390-449; DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
1992] 1761
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Thus, according to several strands of psychological theory,
voluntary choice in a variety of areas engages important intrinsic
sources of motivation and creates the positive expectations that
lead to successful goal achievement. 244 These intrinsic sources of
motivation and positive expectancies are more likely to be acti-
vated when the individual makes a choice that he or she perceives
to be voluntary. To the extent that a decision is externally im-
posed on the individual, or the individual perceives the choice to
be coerced, motivation to succeed will be reduced. 245.
These theoretical examinations of the psychological value of
choice find support in empirical research in a variety of areas in
which it has been demonstrated that allowing individuals to exer-
cise choice increases the likelihood of success. For instance, re-
search with children has demonstrated that involving children in
treatment planning and decisionmaking leads to greater compli-
ance and increases the efficacy of treatment.2 46 Similarly, al-
lowing students to make choices about educational programs
causes them to work "harder, faster, and react[] more positively
to the situation than when they [are] unable to make such
choices." 247 Experts have also suggested that medical and mental
SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 239, at 208-10; MYLES I. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE
H. LACKEY, JR., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN CONTROL: A GENERAL THEORY OF
PURPOSEFUL BEHAVIOR 72-74 (1991) (noting that control leads to self-confi-
dence, which in turn leads to positive behavior); Deci & Ryan, supra note 228, at
41-42, 60-61.
244. See BANDURA, supra note 220, at 467, 471-72. For a further discussion
of the benefits of choice, see supra notes 217-43 and accompanying text.
245. See KIESLER, supra note 242, at 164-65; Winick, supra note 218, at 768-
70.
246. See, e.g., Charles E. Lewis, Decision Making Related to Health: When
Could/Should Children Act Responsibly?, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT
75, 76-79 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) (noting studies that have found
positive effect when children are involved in their health care); Gary B. Melton,
Children's Competence to Consent: A Problem in Law and Social Science, in CHILDREN'S
COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, supra, at 1, 11 (noting that physicians prefer involve-
ment of children in treatment because of increased compliance with treatment
that results); Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children: Psychological Risks and
Benefits, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, supra, at 21, 30-31, 37 (examin-
ing benefits derived from giving children opportunity to choose); Gary B. Mel-
ton, Children's Participation in Treatment Planning: Psychological and Legal Issues, 12
PROF. PSYCHOL. 246, 250-51 (1981) (concluding that giving child "personal con-
trol probably facilitates therapeutic change").
247. Thomas A. Brigham, Some Effects of Choice on Academic Performance, in
CHOICE AND PERCEIVED CONTROL 131, 140 (Lawrence C. Perlmuter & Richard A.
Monty eds., 1979); see also Teresa M. Amabile &Judith Gitomer, Children's Artistic
Creativity: Effects of Choice in Task Materials, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
209, 213 (1984) (restriction of choice negatively affected creativity); Edward L.
Deci et al., Characteristics of the Rewarder and Intrinsic Motivation of the Rewardee, 40J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 9 (1981) (students in autonomy-oriented class-
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health treatment are more effective when provided on a voluntary
rather than involuntary basis. 248
rooms shown to have higher intrinsic motivation and self-esteem than students
in control-oriented classrooms).
248. See APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 125, at 28 (discussing informed con-
sent and noting its positive aspects on treatment); BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 128,
at 178 (recognizing that people who voluntarily commit themselves to treatment
institutions are "more prone to cooperate with the treatment staff and to partici-
pate conscientiously in the treatment program and therefore more likely to ben-
efit from institutionalization than unwilling patients"); BREHM & BREHM, supra
note 219, at 301 (noting theoretical support for proposition that voluntary treat-
ment is more successful than involuntary treatment); MEICHENBAUM & TURK,
supra note 221, at 175; Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Empirical Assessment of Competency
to Consent to Psychiatric Hospitalization, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1170, 1170 (1982)
(noting that clinicians feel that "obtaining the patient's informed cooperation
lends a positive thrust to the treatment process"); Charles M. Culver & Bernard
Gert, The Morality of Involuntary Hospitalization, in THE LAW-MEDICINE RELATION:
A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 159, 171 (Stuart F. Spicker et al. eds., 1981) (dis-
cussing possibility of allowing manic patients to appoint "guardianship commit-
tee" that could sanction future detention and treatment decisions); Edmund J.
Freedberg & William E. Johnston, Effects of Various Sources of Coercion on Outcome of
Treatment ofAlcoholism, 43 PSYCHOL. REP. 1271, 1271, 1277 (1978) (stressing need
for patient to engage in treatment of alcohol problem voluntarily); Robert A.
Nicholson, Correlates of Commitment Status in Psychiatric Patients, 100 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 241, 243-44 (1986) (analyzing difference between patients involuntarily
committed to hospitalization and those who voluntarily entered mental hospital,
determining that voluntary patients were more likely to respond to treatment);
Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individu-
als in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1982, at 161,
189-91; Richard Rogers & Christopher D. Webster, Assessing Treatability in Men-
tally Disordered Offenders, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 20-21 (1989) (suggesting that
"involuntary patients are often more impaired, more resistive to medication,
and have a poorer prognosis than their voluntary counterparts"); Leonard I.
Stein & Mary Ann Test, Alternative to Mental Hospital Treatment, 37 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 392, 392-93 (1980) (discussing benefits of community treatment fa-
cilities); Clifford D. Stromberg & Alan A. Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 328 (1983) (incorporating
idea that voluntary cooperation of patient enhances treatment into model code
for civil commitment); David A. Ward, The Use of Legal Coercion in the Treatment of
Alcoholism: A Methodological Review, in ALCOHOLISM: INTRODUCTION TO THEORY
AND TREATMENT 263, 272 (David A. Ward ed., 1980) ("The systematic evaluation
of existing studies shows that there is no scientific basis upon which to accept the
proposition that the use of legal coercion is effective in treating the alcoholic.");
Note, supra note 2, at 1399 (noting that "advantages of voluntary admissions
flow from the absence of compulsion in the initiation of psychiatric treatment").
An extensive review by Professors Durham and La Fond of the literature on
psychotherapy and psychotropic medication, the two most prevalent forms of
treatment for the mentally ill, found no persuasive evidence that coercive appli-
cation of these techniques to involuntarily committed patients was effective.
Mary L. Durham &John Q La Fond, A Search for the Missing Premise of Involuntary
Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 40 RUTGERS L. REV.
303, 351-56, 367-68 (1988) (analyzing quality of research concerning voluntary
versus involuntary commitment); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
249 n. 15 (1990) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("The efficacy of forced drugging is also
marginal; involuntary patients have a poorer prognosis than cooperating pa-
tients."); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) ("The testi-
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An additional psychological benefit of choice is that, in gen-
eral, having and making choices is developmentally beneficial.
Except for young children, and sometimes even including them,
the more choice we give individuals, the more they will act as ma-
ture, self-determining adults. This connection was recognized by
John Stuart Mill in On Liberty.249 Mill suggested that the exercise
of autonomous decisionmaking is an essential element in the psy-
chological and moral development of the individual, and is neces-
sary to the realization of the individual's full potential.2 50 Indeed,
mony has indicated that involuntary treatment is much less effective than the
same treatment voluntarily received."). See generally Mary L. Durham &John Q
La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of Broadening the Statutory
Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395 (1985) (analyzing ad-
verse effects of statutory broadening of civil commitment standards).
In addition, in all areas of treatment, treatment adherence in general in-
creases when the patient is given choice and participation in the selection of
treatment alternatives and goals. See MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 221, at
157, 159, 175; Deci & Ryan, supra note 228, at 59; Frederick H. Kanfer & Lisa
Gaelick-Buys, Self-Management Methods, in HELPING PEOPLE CHANGE: A TEXTBOOK
OF METHODS 305, 334-47 (Frederick H. Kanfer & Arnold P. Goldstein eds., 4th
ed. 1991) (discussing self-management techniques that are supervised by profes-
sionals but allow for extensive participation by patient).
249. MILL, supra note 32, at 58-63.
250. Mill stated the argument as follows:
The faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental
activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a
choice. He who does anything because it is the custom, makes not
choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is
best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved
only by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a
thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing
only because others believe it. If the grounds of an opinion are not
conclusive to the person's own reason, his reason cannot be strength-
ened, but is likely to be weakened, by his adopting it: and if the induce-
ments to an act are not such as are consentaneous to his own feelings
and character (where affection, or the rights of others, are not con-
cerned) it is so much done towards rendering his feelings and character
inert and torpid, instead of active and energetic. He who lets the
world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no
need of any other faculty than the ape like one of imitation. He who
chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use ob-
servation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather
materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has de-
cided, firmness and self control to hold to his delivered decision. And
these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the
part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment
and feelings is a large one ....
Having said that individuality is the same with development, and
that it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can
produce, well developed human beings, I might here close the argu-
ment: for what more or better can be said of any condition of human
affairs than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best
thing they can be?
60
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when individuals are not permitted a large measure of autono-
mous decisionmaking, but have decisions made for them by
others, they fail to develop those self-determining capabilities
that are essential to mature, adult functioning. Paternalism, espe-
cially excessive paternalism, is inevitably infantilizing.
2 51
A sense of being competent and self-determining provides
strong intrinsic gratification and may be a prerequisite for psy-
chological health. 252 Exercising self-determination is thought to
be a basic human need.253 A variety of studies show that allowing
individuals the opportunity to choose is intrinsically motivating,
and that denying them the opportunity to choose "undermines
[their] motivation, learning, and general sense of organismic well-
being." 254 Indeed, the stress of losing the opportunity to be self-
determining may cause "severe somatic malfunctions" and even
death.2
55
Treating individuals as competent adults able to make
choices and exercise a degree of control over their lives rather
than as incompetent subjects of governmental paternalism and
control will predictably have a beneficial effect. Denying people a
sense of control over important areas of their lives can have
strongly negative consequences. Indeed, when people feel that
they can have no influence over matters that vitally affect them,
they may develop what Martin Seligman called "learned helpless-
ness." 256 Seligman's experimental work with animals and human
Id. at 58.
251. Joel Feinberg has commented:
If adults are treated as children they will come in time to be like chil-
dren. Deprived of the right to choose for themselves, they will soon
lose the power of rational judgment and decision. Even children, after
a certain point, had better not be "treated as children," or they will
never acquire the outlook and capability of responsible adults.
JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 46 (1973).
252. Deci & Ryan, supra note 228, at 61, 72-73.
253. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 239, at
208-09 (discussing "intrinsic motivation" as providing energy for various func-
tions of will); see also HEINZ HARTMANN, EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF
ADAPTATION (1958) ("independent ego energy"); Robert W. White, Motivation
Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence, 66 PSYCHOL. REV. 297 (1959) ("effectance
motivation").
254. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 239, at
209 (discussing studies).
255. Id.
256. See BREHM & BREHM, supra note 219, at 378 (discussing relationship
between control and helplessness); MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON
DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH (1975) (discussing "learned helpless-
ness" theory and possible methods to alleviate learned helplessness); HUMAN
HELPLESSNESS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (Judy Garber & Martin E. P. Seligman
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subjects led him to posit that repetitive events outside an individ-
ual's control may produce a generalized feeling of ineffectiveness
that debilitates performance and undermines motivation and per-
ceptions of competence. Depriving individuals of a sense of con-
trol over the outcomes they experience produces feelings of
helplessness, hopelessness, passivity and depression. By contrast,
when individuals exercise control and make choices, they experi-
ence increased opportunities to build skills necessary for success-
ful living. As a result, they gradually acquire feelings of self-
efficacy, which in turn become important determinants of motiva-
tion and performance. 257 Hopefully, if given meaningful choices,
individuals will perceive themselves as in control of their lives
rather than as mere passive victims of forces they can neither un-
derstand nor control. This latter view of the self undoubtedly
contributes to the existence and continuation of a variety of social
and health problems.
Allowing individuals to be self-determining in important ar-
eas of their lives-for example, in the areas of health, education,
occupation, and family-can only increase personal satisfaction
and confidence in the therapeutic, 258 educational, work, or family
effort. Choice enhances performance and motivation to succeed.
Research with nursing home residents supports the conclusion
that allowing individuals to exercise control over decisions affect-
ing them is psychologically beneficial. 259 This research demon-
eds., 1980) (compiling work of several experts on learned helplessness theory);
Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformulation,
87J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49 (1978) (discussing theory of learned helplessness
and reformulating theory to apply to human conduct); Deci & Ryan, supra note
228, at 41-42, 60-63, 67 (noting theory, similar to learned helplessness, that
when individuals lose choice they also lose intrinsic motivation); Steven F. Maier
& Martin E. P. Seligman, Learned Helplessness: Theory and Evidence, 105 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL PSYCHOL. 3, 16-19 (1976) (detailing theory of learned helplessness);
Jerry W. Thornton & Paul D. Jacobs, Learned Helplessness in Human Subjects, 87 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 367 (1971) (detailing experiment that used human sub-
jects to test learned helplessness theory); see also DECX, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 239; Rotter, supra note 233, at 24-25 (viewing
behavior as function of individual expectancies concerning whether outcomes
are determined by individual's own actions or by external forces beyond individ-
ual's control).
257. See BANDURA, supra note 220, at 390-449; BREHM & BREHM, supra note
219, at 376-78 (noting that increased motivation is one of positive effects of
control); Deci & Ryan, supra note 228, at 41-42, 60-61 (recognizing that when
people are given choices, intrinsic motivation increases).
258. See David B. Wexler, Doctor-Patient Dialogue: A Second Opinion on Talk
Therapy Through Law, 90 YALE L.J. 458, 469 (1980) (book review).
259. Ellen J. Langer & Judith Rodin, The Effects of Choice and Enhanced Per-
sonal Responsibility for the Aged: A Field Experiment in an Institutional Setting, 34 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 191 (1976).
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strated that providing residents increased choices and
responsibilities produced improvement in their condition.2 60
People given choices-and hence treated with dignity and re-
spect, as persons rather than as objects-also feel better about
their circumstances and perform better as a result. For example,
an increasing body of social psychology research on legal proce-
dures shows that litigants given choices and permitted to partici-
pate in a proceeding that will decide issues that are important to
them are more satisfied with the process and more willing to ac-
cept and comply with the decision reached.26'
Exercising choice and experiencing a sense of control over
important events in their lives may be an essential ingredient in
producing mature, self-determining, well-adjusted, happy, and
successful members of society. In contrast, when government
forces people to act in certain ways, denying them the ability to
choose such conduct for themselves, the results may be counter-
productive. For example, individuals coerced to participate in ed-
ucation and treatment programs-whether coerced by judges,
correctional authorities, parole officers, mental health profession-
als, or others-often just go through the motions, satisfying the
formal requirements of the program without deriving any real
benefits. 262 Indeed, such coercion may backfire, producing a neg-
260. Id. at 197.
261. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 26-30 (1988) (discussing studies that show connection be-
tween perceived fairness and procedural rules); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 83-84, 94-95, 118
(1975) (finding adversarial system superior to other judicial systems because of
level of control retained by individual); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
LAw 126-30 (1990) (recognizing connection between perceived fairness and pro-
cedural control); E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instru-
mental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 952, 957 (1990) (determining that ability to present information at
trial led to increase in perception of fairness of judgement); Stephen LaTour,
Determinants of Participant and Observer Satisfaction with Adversary and Inquisitorial
Modes of Adjudication, 36J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1531-33 (1978) (noting
that one reason defendants studied were more satisfied with verdicts under ad-
versarial system rather than inquisitorial system is that defendants may have per-
ceived more control over process in adversarial system because of ability to
select attorney); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences ofJudicial Procedures:
Implicationsfor Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 433, 433-45 (1992)
(discussing psychological consequences of judicial commitment hearings). For
an analysis of the participatory value of hearings from a legal perspective, see
Winick, supra note 178, at 801-06.
262. Coerced education and treatment are often implemented by correc-
tional authorities, by authorities in the psychiatric setting, or by the courts as a
condition of diversion, probation, or parole. See COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND
SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: THE 30s TO THE 80s 889 (1977) (noting problems
1992] 1767
63
Winick: On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ative "psychological reactance" that creates oppositional behav-
ior and leads to failure. 263 Coercion may also trigger a form of
the "overjustification effect," in which the individual may accom-
plish a specified goal, but because the individual attributes this
performance to external pressure, he or she does not experience
any lasting attitudinal or behavioral change.2 64 The voluntary
choice of a course of conduct, however, involves a degree of inter-
nalized commitment to the goal often not present when the goal
is imposed involuntarily.
265
Thus, psychological theory provides an important justifica-
tion for the law's preference for individual autonomy. People
function better, with greater success and satisfaction, when per-
mitted to make choices for themselves in important areas of their
lives. Permitting individuals the opportunity to make their own
choices and to experience the effects of such choices is develop-
mentally beneficial and may be essential to psychological well-be-
ing. Paternalism, by contrast, may not work as well and may often
be counterproductive.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. The Value of Autonomy
Our political and legal conceptions of autonomy are aspira-
tional. They are based on a conception of the individual as a ra-
tional decisionmaker able to make free choices reflecting internal
values and preferences. In reality, however, this atomistic con-
ception of the individual is artificial. The individual is a compo-
nent of at least several social groups-the family, the work place,
involved with treatment administered involuntarily); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE
COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 97-98 (1971) (noting problems inherent in coerced education and re-
habilitation used by prison system); Winick, Right to Refuse, supra note 1, at 83-87
(noting problems with forced psychotherapy and counseling programs).
263. See JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1966)
(developing general theory of psychological reactance); BREHM & BREHM, supra
note 219, at 300-01 (discussing patient reactance in forced therapy); KIESLER,
supra note 242, at 167.
264. See KIESLER, supra note 242, at 167; RICHARD E. PETY &JOHN T. CACI-
oppo, ATITUDES AND PERSUASION: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES
169-70 (1981) (discussing evidence and examples of "overjustification effect");
Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J.
PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 105, 105 (1971) (recognizing that some research-
ers have postulated connection between external rewards and shift from internal
to external motivation).
265. For a further discussion of the benefits of individual goal selection, see
supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text. See also Deci & Ryan, supra note 228,
at 59, 61.
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a variety of associations and interest groups, and the community.
The individual's decisionmaking is heavily dependent upon the
desires of these other groups and the anticipated impact the indi-
vidual's decisions will have on them. We are by nature commu-
nal, more interdependent than independent. Our choices are
almost never wholly free; rather, they are constrained by a variety
of social, economic, religious, psychological, and familial pres-
sures that produce choices we often perceive to be anything but
free.
Our idealized model of individual autonomy is thus inconsis-
tent with psychological realities and largely artificial. Neverthe-
less, our political conception of the individual as an autonomous
decisionmaker, able to make rational choices free of constraints,
is a useful foundation upon which to build a legal system. This
conception of the individual is particularly useful as a basis for a
constitutional structure, a major function of which is to place limi-
tations on governmental power. The focus of this Article, after
all, is the place of individual autonomy in our legal system. The
Article examines the concept of autonomy from several perspec-
tives in order to provide the groundwork for an analysis of how
our law should be structured so as to strike a proper balance be-
tween individual self-determination and the needs and interests
of an organized society in an increasingly complex world. Our
political conception of the freely autonomous individual may not
be appropriate for designing the family, the work place, or the
football team. In the context of constructing a legal system, how-
ever, this conception may be useful. In attempting to define the
sphere of individual decisionmaking that should be free from
governmental intrusion, it is appropriate to adopt a view of the
individual as possessing a higher degree of autonomous decision-
making capacity than may be realistic.
We thus cherish autonomy and the conception of the individ-
ual as possessing a significant degree of freedom over the impor-
tant aspects of his or her life. We therefore erect barriers against
governmental intrusion into these areas in order to permit the
individual's spirit and intellect to flourish, to facilitate the pursuit
of happiness, and to maximize the potential for self-fulfillment.
We ascribe and attribute freedom and autonomy to the individual
partly for normative reasons-because within our traditions it is
hard to conceive of a legal and social order that does not treat
people this way-and partly for utilitarian reasons-because in
our view to do so will maximize individual and social utility. For
1992] 1769
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these reasons, we adopt a conception of the individual as autono-
mous both because we think the principles of morality and justice
require it, and because in our judgment this conception will maxi-
mize individual and societal well-being. These are the teachings
of John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel
Kant, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and William 0.
Douglas.
The value of autonomy infuses and shapes our basic concep-
tions of the relationship between society and the individual. In
our society, which is premised on the importance of the individ-
ual, the notions of individual autonomy and the citizen's right to
chart his or her own destiny are highly valued political ideals that
inevitably and properly are reflected in our constitutional and
legal structures. This must be so for a government dedicated to
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Because individual concep-
tions of happiness inevitably differ, the individual, and not the
government, must select his or her own path to that promised
land.
This attribution of autonomy to the individual, particularly in
the service of defining limitations upon governmental authority
over the individual, can also be justified by principles of psychol-
ogy that help us to understand how individuals learn and behave.
Attributing autonomy to the individual and protecting a relatively
large sphere of autonomous decisionmaking may be essential to
psychological well-being and may facilitate the individual's
achievement of the goals he or she sets. In general, a policy of
respect for individual choice fosters intrinsic motivation and per-
sonal satisfaction. By contrast, excessive governmental paternal-
ism and control can be counterproductive, ultimately frustrating
the attainment of whatever goals government may think the indi-
vidual should seek to achieve.
Psychological theory thus suggests that allowing people to
make choices for themselves will be beneficial in a number of
ways. Even assuming the truth of these theoretical assumptions,
however, they do not alone justify the adoption of legal rules that
seek to maximize individual autonomy. Whether a legal system
should promote autonomy is a normative question. These psy-
chological observations about human nature and behavior do not
justify the adoption of legal rules without at least an implicit nor-
mative premise that as a society we should pursue such values as
self-determining capacity, effective goal achievement, and individ-
ual psychological satisfaction. Our society, however, does and
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traditionally has embraced these values. It was to secure liberty
and to facilitate the pursuit of happiness that we sought and won
our independence and ordained and established the Constitution.
We rejected government absolutism in favor of a conception of
government that allows each individual to determine and pursue
his or her own conception of the good life. These are the values
upon which our nation was founded. Assuming a continued com-
mitment to these values, the psychological benefits of allowing in-
dividual choice argue strongly in favor of a legal system that
treasures the principle of autonomy and that interferes only mini-
mally with individual choice and only when the attainment of
other cherished values necessitates it. Autonomy, accordingly,
should be presumptively protected by our law, and government
should bear a heavy burden ofjustification when it seeks to inter-
fere with an individual's choice. When the area of choice involved
is one of those important life decisions that our history and tradi-
tion leave to the individual, that burden should be extremely high
and the individual's claim of liberty should receive a special mea-
sure of protection.
B. Implications for Mental Health Law
What are the implications for mental health law of this polit-
ical conception of individual autonomy versus governmental con-
trol, and of the psychological justifications for embracing
autonomy? These political and psychological conceptions do not,
of course, suggest that individual autonomy should never be re-
stricted. Autonomy is not the only value we respect. One individ-
ual's liberty may clash with that of another, and a basic function of
government must be to protect an individual from the harmful
acts of others. In addition, there may be occasions when an indi-
vidual's ability to engage in autonomous decisionmaking is so im-
paired by mental illness, age, or other causes that principles of
beneficence justify paternalistic interventions into the life of the
individual. There may even be circumstances when the intrusion
into autonomy is so minor or so limited in time that principles of
beneficence justify governmental action to protect the individual
without a demonstration that the individual's ability to choose is
impaired.2 66 But when the intrusion is serious, when it affects the
266. For example, when the legislature requires automobile manufacturers
to install seatbelts and motorists to wear them, it is undeniably interfering with
the liberty of manufacturers to sell cars without seatbelts and the liberty of con-
sumers to buy such cars or to enjoy the comfort and convenience of not wearing
them. This matter could be left to the marketplace, with manufacturers permit-
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individual's ability to make the ultimate decisions that shape his
or her life, the high value we place on autonomy requires that the
government meet a high burden of justification.
The legal and psychological perspectives on autonomy dis-
cussed in this Article suggest that justifications for intruding on
autonomy that are grounded in principles of beneficence-princi-
pally, those based on the state's parens patriae power-be narrowly
defined. The parens patriae power allows government to engage in
decisionmaking in the best interest of persons who by reason of
age or disability are incapable of making such decisions for them-
selves. 267 Historically, the parens patriae power was premised on
the presumed incapacity of minors and mentally disabled persons
to protect or care for themselves. 268 Because this power is based
on the need for the government to protect the well-being of its
citizens when they cannot care for themselves, the government's
ability to invoke this power to intrude on individual choices in
important areas of life should be limited to situations involving
individuals who, because of age or physical or mental disability,
are incapable of determining their own best interests for them-
selves. Although a number of cases have alluded to this limita-
tion, 269 it has not been authoritatively recognized as a general
ted to provide seatbelts as an optional feature at an added price, and consumers
permitted to choose the combination of risk and price that to them seems best.
Motorists also could be given the choice of whether or not to wear seatbelts.
Information about risks and benefits could be made available, while the choice
could be left to the individual, who generally is fully competent to assess the
risks and benefits. These alternative approaches would interfere less with auton-
omy than the compulsory seatbelt requirement, but in this instance the pre-
sumed additional beneficence that would be produced by the seatbelt
requirement is thought to outweigh the resulting loss of autonomy. The intru-
sion on autonomy involved seems relatively minor. Economic interests and
comfort and convenience may be affected, but not the exercise of basic human
rights. Moreover, the substitution of government compulsion for individual
choice here would not produce effects that are psychologically debilitating, as
might more likely occur in areas involving fundamental personal choices.
267. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 296 (1982); see also JOEL FEINBERG,
HARM TO SELF 6 (1986) (analyzing parens patriae power); Winick, Competency to
Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 16 & n.3 (discussing scope of government's
parens patriae power); Winick, supra note 224, at 374 (examining government's
parens patriae power to make decisions for those who are unable to make deci-
sions for themselves); Note, supra note 2, at 1207-45 (discussing commitment
under parens patriae power of state).
268. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (discussing in dicta
parens patriae power of government); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583
(1975) (Burger, CJ., concurring) (noting historical roots of parens patriae power);
Winick, supra note 224, at 375 (noting historical derivations of parens patriae
power); Note, supra note 2, at 1212-16 (discussing historical roots of parens pa-
triae power of state).
269. The cases have usually involved assertions of a right to refuse anti-
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principle, and its justifications have not been adequately ex-
amined. In addition to our political preference for individual au-
tonomy, the psychological value of recognizing autonomy and the
difficulties that refusing to recognize autonomy may produce
strongly support the recognition of incompetency as a necessary
condition for governmental assertion of the parens patriae power as
a justification for intrusions on important areas of autonomy.
Moreover, the concept of incompetency in this context
should be narrowly defined, and a strong presumption in favor of
competency should be applied. Although a number of cases have
recognized such a presumption in favor of competency, 270 and
psychotic medication. See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir.
1984) (refusing to allow jail staff to inject accused with thorazine in order to
keep him competent for trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Rennie v. Klein,
653 F.2d 836, 846-47 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (noting that "[t]here must
be a careful balancing of the patient's interest" with those of the state), vacated
and remanded, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657-59 (1st
Cir. 1980) (requiring individual to be incompetent to make decision concerning
mental health treatment before state can justify use of its parens patriae power),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Winters v.
Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68-71 (2d Cir.) (holding that woman stated cause of action
on which relief could be granted when she alleged that hospital rendered invol-
untary care without first having her found legally incompetent), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 985 (1971); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935-36 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(holding that patient being declared mentally ill does not in itself justify use of
parens patriae power to forcibly administer psychotropic drugs when patient is
still competent to make decision); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo.
1985) (en banc) (specifying limits on involuntary administration of antipsychotic
drugs); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 747 n.5 (D.C. 1979) (holding that commitment
of individual alone is insufficient to justify overriding individual's treatment de-
cisions); Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (refusing to
allow electric shock treatment of patient who was not declared legally incompe-
tent to consent); Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Health, 458
N.E.2d 308, 322 (Mass. 1983) (limiting use of state's parens patriae power where
no threat of violence existed to "rare circumstances"); Opinion of the Justices,
465 A.2d 484, 489-90 (N.H. 1983) (holding that power to administer forcible
medical treatment does not automatically follow exercise of power to involunta-
rily hospitalize patient; rather, requires showing that individual is incapable of
making informed decision); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342-43 (N.Y. 1986)
(holding that to impose involuntary antipsychotic medication, state must show
that patient is incompetent and must also show compelling state interest); In re
K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 750-52 (Okla. 1980) (denying hospital right to administer
psychotropic drugs against mentally ill patient's will). See generally Winick, Com-
petency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 16-17 & n.3 (collecting cases that
recognize that legitimate power of government to protect citizens who cannot
protect themselves is limited to situations in which citizen is incompetent).
270. See, e.g., Lotman v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 478 F.2d 868, 873 (3d
Cir. 1973) (stating that "there is a legal presumption that everyone is sane");
Winters, 446 F.2d at 68 (holding that judicial finding that person was mentally ill
did not create presumption that person was incompetent to make decisions);
Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361 (D. Mass. 1979) ("[A]lthough commit-
ted, a mental patient is nonetheless presumed competent to manage his affairs,
dispose of property, carry on a licensed profession, and even to vote."), aff'd in
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commentators have defended it,271 the presumption was recently
questioned by the Supreme Court in its broad dicta in Zinermon v.
Burch.272 In contexts in which the individual seeks voluntarily to
make a choice, the choice should rarely be disturbed. Rather, the
government, if it seeks to challenge such a choice on the basis that
it is incompetent, should bear a heavy burden of demonstrating
incompetency.2 7 3 A strong presumption of competency should
apply even to those suffering from mental illness. Although
mental illness sometimes impairs decisionmaking capacity, often
it does not.274 Moreover, even when mental illness impairs the
part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1 st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills
v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (vacating on grounds that state law might afford
greater protections than federal Constitution and thus avoiding unnecessary
consideration of federal constitutional law issues); Child v. Wainwright, 148 So.
2d 526, 527 (Fla. 1963) (noting that defendant was presumed sane); Howe v.
Howe, 99 Mass. 88, 98 (1868) (noting presumption of sanity of grantor wishing
to void deed for reason of insanity); Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235
(Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (noting presumption of competency when determining
whether adult needs guardian appointed by court to make medical decisions);
Grannum v. Berard, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (Wash. 1967) (noting that individual is
presumed sane for purpose of consenting to surgery).
271. See, e.g., BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 128, at 341 n.167, 375; 1 PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MED. & BIoMED. & BEHAV.
RES., MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATION-
SHIP 3, 56 (1982) (discussing informed consent and presumption of compe-
tency); THOMAS GRIsso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS
AND INSTRUMENTS 314-15 (1986) (defining competency to consent); Annas &
Densberger, supra note 134, at 575 ("The legal rule is that competence is pre-
sumed."); Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 22-23 & n.19
("The law presumes that people are competent to make decisions unless they
have been adjudicated incompetent.").
272. 494 U.S. 113, 133 & n.18 (1990) (holding that even if request for ad-
mission to hospital for medical treatment might be taken at face value, state
"may not be justified in doing so, without further inquiry, as to a mentally ill
person's request for admission and treatment at a mental hospital."). For a criti-
cal assessment of Zinermon, see Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitali-
zation, supra note 1.
273. See Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992) (upholding constitu-
tionality of statutory presumption in favor of competency to stand trial that
placed burden of proving incompetency by preponderance of evidence on party
questioning competency). For an analysis of Medina and a defense of its treat-
ment of the presumption in favor of competency, see Bruce J. Winick, Presump-
tions and Burdens of Proof in Determining Competency to Stand Trial: An Analysis of
Medina v. California and the Supreme Court's New Due Process Methodology in Criminal
Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 1993).
274. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 220 (1987) ("The mere presence of psychosis, demen-
tia, mental retardation, or some other form of mental illness or disability is in-
sufficient in itself to constitute incompetence."); Karen McKinnon et al., Rivers in
Practice: Clinicians' Assessments of Patients' Decision-Making Capacity, 40 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1159, 1159 (1989) ("Clinical evidence suggests that de-
spite alterations in thinking and mood, psychiatric patients are not automatically
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capacity to make decisions in certain areas, capacity is often left
unimpaired in others.2 75
When an individual suffering from mental illness seeks to
agree to an intervention proposed by a professional under a fidu-
ciary duty to act in his best interests, there should be a particu-
larly strong presumption that his assent was competent. This
strong presumption should apply when a mental patient assents
to a treatment recommendation made by a therapist 276 or to vol-
untary hospitalization that a clinician has determined to be appro-
priate. 277 The presumption of competency also should apply
when a mentally impaired criminal defendant seeks, with the
agreement of counsel, to plead guilty or to stand trial.278 Only
upon a clear showing that the individual's assent is the product of
mental illness should his or her expressed choice be disturbed.
Moreover, even in cases in which the individual is not assenting to
a recommendation made or concurred in by a professional, the
individual should be presumed competent. Although the pre-
sumption should not be as strong in such instances, the burden
should still be placed on those questioning competency.
When the individual objects to something that the govern-
ment would like him or her to do, such as to accept treatment or
hospitalization, the individual's objection should be honored un-
less the state has carried the burden of demonstrating that the
objection was incompetent or that the need to protect others ne-
cessitates intervention. Personal choice in these matters of signif-
icance to the individual's life should presumptively be respected
because of both the high value we place on individual autonomy
and the psychological value to the individual of honoring his or
her choice. Allowing individuals to pursue goals they have volun-
tarily chosen will facilitate goal achievement, while compelling in-
less capable than others of making health care decisions."); Stephen J. Morse,
Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L.
REV. 527, 573, 588 (1978); Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1,
at 17-18; Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization, supra note 1, at
188-90; see also Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341-42 (N.Y. 1986).
275. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 23-24, 37-41.
276. See Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1.
277. See Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization, supra note 1.
278. See Bruce J. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An Assessment of the Costs
and Benefits, and a Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 259-81 (1987)
(arguing that "criminal defendant can clearly express a desire to stand trial or
plead notwithstanding his mental impairment" that in some circumstances
should be respected); Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, supra note 2,
at 951-79 (asserting that "the defendant should be allowed to waive his possible
incompetency to stand trial or plead guilty").
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dividuals to pursue goals to which they object is unlikely to
produce success.
Our commitment to the autonomy principle, deeply rooted
in American constitutional history and tradition, together with
the psychological value of self-determination, casts substantial
doubt on the wisdom of the Supreme Court's recent dicta in
Zinermon that questions a presumption in favor of the competency
of the mentally ill. The presumption in favor of competency
should be reaffirmed, and incompetency should be narrowly de-
fined. 279 Only in clear cases should an individual be deemed in-
competent when he or she is able to articulate a choice.28 0 When
the individual is found to be incompetent for a particular pur-
pose, he or she should continue to be presumed competent for
other purposes. 28' The state's parens patriae power, authorizing
intrusions on important areas of autonomy, should be narrowly
construed to require a strong showing of incompetency as a pre-
279. For example, the courts should define the competency of a mental pa-
tient to consent to voluntary hospitalization as follows:
As long as the patient understands that the facility he is seeking admis-
sion to is a psychiatric hospital, that he will receive care and treatment
there, and that release is not automatic, but can occur if he should
change his mind and that in such an event he can obtain help from any
staff member to gain his release, he should be deemed competent.
Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization, supra note 1, at 191. Peo-
ple suffering from mental retardation present distinct problems with respect to
the definition of incompetency and the justifications for paternalistic interven-
tions. SeeJames R. Ellis, Decisions By and For People With Mental Retardation: Balanc-
ing Considerations of Autonomy and Protection, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1779 (1992).
280. See Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at 44 (sug-
gesting that presumption in favor of competency should be rebutted in case of
individual expressing choice only when that person's expressed choice "was the
product of pathological delusions or hallucinations, or based on beliefs that
were intrinsically irrational or on reasons that were clearly irrelevant"); see, e.g.,
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990) (delusional patient seeking volun-
tary hospitalization who thought he was entering heaven deemed incompetent
to consent to hospitalization); Department of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563
S.W.2d 197, 211-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that delusional denial by
gangrenous patient that she could live without amputation rendered her incom-
petent to refuse recommended surgery).
When the patient is delusional, but the delusions are not the primary reason
for the individual's treatment decision, however, the patient should not be found
incompetent. See, e.g., In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623 (1973); see also
APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 274, at 214, 219; APPELBAUM ET AL., supra
note 125, at 82; BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 128, at 185, 258, 438-39; DAVID B.
WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 40 (1981); Allan M. Tepper & Amiram
Elwork, Competence to Consent to Treatment as a Psychological Construct, 8 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 205, 207 (1984); Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 1, at
22-23.
281. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 128, at 340; APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra
note 274, at 219; APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 125, at 82; BEAUCHAMP & CHIL-
DRESS, supra note 31, at 170-71.
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requisite for its assertion. Our society should be benevolent,
but we should resist the temptation to impose benevolence
coercively.
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